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Corporate Compliance and Criminality: Does the 
Common Law Promote Culpable Blindness?
MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER & ANDREW M. BRANDES
Could corporate directors and officers face criminal liability for actions that 
ostensibly comport with common law fiduciary duties? Answering this rather odd 
question has gained paramount importance following the United States Justice 
Department’s recent promulgation of aggressive new prosecution policies 
targeting individual officers and directors responsible for major corporate 
misconduct. In September 2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
disseminated an official policy memorandum entitled, Individual Accountability 
for Corporate Wrongdoing. The Yates Memo instructs federal prosecutors to ferret 
out and punish individual executives, officers, and board members who commit 
crimes on behalf of the corporation. The recent indictment of several Volkswagen 
executives connected with the auto emissions defeat device scandal represents a 
prominent example of the new prosecutorial philosophy.  
The shift in prosecutorial focus by the DOJ pursuant to the Yates Memo has 
created a substantial jurisprudential rift between federal standards for criminal 
prosecution of corporate agents and common law standards for fulfilling the 
fiduciary duties of officers and directors. Prior to this new, zealous prosecution 
program, the common law presumption embodied in the “business judgment rule” 
regularly shielded directors and officers from liability for lax oversight practices, 
even with criminal activity running rampant throughout the corporation. Under 
the guidance of the Yates Memo, however, the government now holds directors 
and officers to higher standards of oversight than the common law requires. The 
implications of this jurisprudential rift between federal prosecutorial and common 
law fiduciary standards are incredibly important. At the outset, the common law 
standards surrounding the business judgment rule no longer provide sufficient 
guidance for avoiding civil or criminal liability. In addition, were a director or 
officer to face criminal sanctions for failed oversight, the very existence of 
criminal liability would likely result in an exception to the business judgment 
rule’s application. As a result, what might have been a minimally compliant 
oversight system under the common law becomes actionable. Such bizarre 
circularity makes the common law jurisprudentially schizophrenic. To the extent 
common law duties fail to align with federal standards, fiduciary duties regarding 
corporate compliance risk becoming unworkable and ultimately irrelevant. This 
Article argues that redirecting common law fiduciary duties to follow federal 
prosecution standards will better ensure corporate accountability, reduce acts of 
corporate misconduct, and promote trust in the capital markets.
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Corporate Compliance and Criminality: Does the 
Common Law Promote Culpable Blindness?
MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER* & ANDREW M. BRANDES**
INTRODUCTION
Could corporate directors and officers face criminal liability for actions 
that ostensibly comport with common law fiduciary duties? Answering this 
rather odd question has gained paramount importance following the United 
States Justice Department’s (“DOJ”) recent promulgation of aggressive 
new prosecution policies targeting individual officers and directors 
responsible for major corporate misconduct. Most recently, in September 
2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates disseminated an 
official policy memorandum entitled, Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing (the “Yates Memo”).1 The Yates Memo instructs 
federal prosecutors to ferret out and punish individual executives, officers, 
and board members who commit crimes on behalf of their corporations.2 In 
the wake of several major banking scandals that undermined public 
confidence in the capital markets and justice system for failing to hold 
corporate executives responsible,3 the prosecutorial policy shift embraced 
in the Yates Memo stemmed from the basic realization that
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1 Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Individual 
Accountability for Corp. Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download [https://perma.cc/L762-ZQ3R]; see also Individual Accountability, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability [https://perma.cc/23AB-EKPD] (detailing the six 
steps discussed in the Yates Memo to strengthen pursuit of individuals in corporate wrongdoing cases).
2 See Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the N.Y.C. Bar 
Association White Collar Crime Conference (May 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma. 
cc/X83L-PLZC] (“[H]olding accountable the people who committed the wrongdoing is essential if we 
are truly going to deter corporate misdeeds, have a real impact on corporate culture and ensure that the 
public has confidence in our justice system. We cannot have a different system of justice—or the 
perception of a different system of justice—for corporate executives than we do for everyone else.”).
3 See Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-punishment.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4SF6-BJ7P] (discussing how no banks or executives would face criminal charges for the financial crisis 
and how this eroded public confidence in the law); see also Sarah White, Not One Top Wall Street 
Executive Has Been Convicted of Criminal Charges Related to 2008 Crisis, HUFFPOST (Sept. 13, 2013, 
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[c]orporations can only commit crimes through 
flesh-and-blood people. It’s only fair that the people who are 
responsible for committing those crimes be held accountable. 
The public needs to have confidence that there is one system 
of justice and it applies equally regardless of whether that 
crime occurs on a street corner or in a boardroom.4
By holding individuals to account for corporate criminality, the DOJ hoped 
to restore a crumbling public trust.5
Some initially remained skeptical of the impact of the Yates Memo on 
criminal prosecutions of individual corporate actors,6 but little doubt about 
the effect of the policy shift remained following the arrests of several 
Volkswagen executives connected with the auto emissions defeat device 
(“Defeat Device”) scandal.7 In January 2017, Volkswagen agreed to plead 
guilty on three criminal felony counts and pay $4.3 billion in fines 
                                                                                                                         
7:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/13/wall-street-prosecution_n_3919792.html
[https://perma.cc/M7TQ-XTAM] (comparing various countries’ handling of criminal charges after the 
crisis and what regulations led to the difference); Aruna Viswanatha, Elizabeth Warren Says DOJ and 
SEC Are Lousy at Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2016, 3:14 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2016/01/29/elizabeth-warren-doj-and-sec-are-lousy-at-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/VM2S-RVXH]
(detailing Elizabeth Warren’s comments on weak enforcement by the SEC).
4 William D. Cohan, Justice Department Shift on White-Collar Crime Is Long Overdue, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/business/dealbook/justice-dept-shift-on-
white-collar-crime-is-long-overdue.html [https://perma.cc/5RPX-R8B5].
5 Devlin Barrett, Justice Department Renews Focus on White-Collar Cases, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
10, 2015, 9:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-renews-focus-on-white-collar-
cases-1441849429 [https://perma.cc/C53W-VAV2].
6 See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016 HOW WEAK 
ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY 4 (Jan. 2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/
files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T4N-MHAN] (“Despite this rhetoric, 
DOJ civil and criminal settlements—and enforcement actions by other federal agencies—continually 
fail to impose any serious threat of punishment on corporate offenders.”); U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, DOJ’S NEW THRESHOLD FOR “COOPERATION” 4–5 (May 2016),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/YatesMemoPaper_Pages_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AEA8-B7A5]; David Woodcock & John T. Sullivan, Individuals in the Cross Hairs, 
What This Means for Directors, JONES DAY (Mar. 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/individuals-in-the-
cross-hairs-what-this-means-for-directors-03-10-2016/ [https://perma.cc/75NS-YCEL] (“The Yates 
Memo has the potential to affect many aspects of corporate investigations and prosecutions, but it does 
not change the standards for proving criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a serious 
hurdle to proving individual liability. Nevertheless, the government's focus on individual liability 
creates additional risks.”); Rena Steinzor, White-Collar Reset: The DOJ’s Yates Memo and its Potential 
to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39, 66–67 (2017).
7 See Hiroko Tabuchi et al., 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads Guilty in 
Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11
/business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/3VQU-PNHQ]
(reporting criminal charges announced by federal prosecutors in the Volkswagen emissions cheating 
scandal); Jack Ewing et al., Volkswagen Executive’s Trip to U.S. Allowed F.B.I. to Pounce, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/business/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-oliver-
schmidt.html [https://perma.cc/9XDW-STE6] (reporting the arrest of Oliver Schmidt in connection 
with Volkswagen’s emissions cheating).
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resulting from its use of an emissions-cheating device installed in 
thousands of diesel vehicles8 and from obstructing justice in lying about 
the scheme.9 In addition to securing the corporation’s confession of guilt, 
the DOJ announced criminal charges against six Volkswagen executives 
for their individual roles in perpetuating the Defeat Device fraud.10 Driving 
home the new focus on individual culpability, Deputy Attorney General 
Yates stated, “[t]his wasn’t simply the action of some faceless, 
multinational corporation. . . . This conspiracy involved flesh-and-blood 
individuals . . . . We’ve followed the evidence—from the showroom to the 
boardroom—and it brought us to the people whose indictments we 
announce today.”11
Many suspect that the government will use each arrest to climb farther 
up the corporate criminal ladder.12 Although five of the individuals remain 
in Germany,13 the F.B.I. arrested one executive in Florida, Oliver Schmidt, 
who previously served as Volkswagen’s top emissions compliance officer 
in the United States.14 Federal prosecutors charged Schmidt with eleven 
felony counts for which he faced up to 169 years in prison, if found 
guilty.15 Perhaps as a result of such pressure, in early August 2017, 
Schmidt pleaded guilty to two felony counts.16 Although sentencing will 
not occur until December 2017, Schmidt now faces seven years in prison, 
subsequent deportation, and a fine of up to $400,000.17 Although it’s 
unclear whether Schmidt will serve as a governmental witness against 
other Volkswagen executives as part of his plea bargain, because Mr. 
Schmidt “warned executives in Germany that the company could face 
                                                                                                                         
8 Tabuchi et al., supra note 7. For a detailed discussion of the Defeat Device Scandal, see Guilbert 
Gates et al., How Volkswagen’s “Defeat Devices” Worked, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/P7AF-4VCP] (last updated Mar. 16, 2017).
9 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead 
Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and 
Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and-
civil-penalties-six [https://perma.cc/NGR5-6EFX].
10 Tabuchi et al., supra note 7.
11 Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 9.
12 For a general discussion of the Yates Memo’s incentives to elicit information about higher 
ranking corporate executives, see Elizabeth E. Joh and Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: 
The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015).




15 Nick Carey, Volkswagen Executive Pleads Guilty in U.S. Emissions Cheating Case, REUTERS
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkwwagen-emissions-idUSKBN1AK1OY
[https://perma.cc/B76G-MD4D].
16 Vlasic, supra note 13.
17 Carey, supra note 15.
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criminal charges for its action,”18 prosecutors hope he will be valuable in 
ongoing investigations of higher-ranking corporate officials regarding their 
own criminal complicity.19 Along with the information received from a 
Volkswagen software engineer who pleaded guilty to conspiracy in 
September 2016,20 the plea agreement with Schmidt emboldened the 
Department of Justice to redouble its pledge that “Schmidt, along with 
each and every official involved in this emissions scandal, will be held 
fully accountable for their actions by the Department of Justice as this 
investigation continues.”21
The DOJ’s targeting of individual wrongdoers responsible for 
perpetrating—or casting a blind eye to—Volkswagen’s fraudulent scheme 
heralds a new era of heightened scrutiny of directors and officers regarding 
corporate oversight practices. Prior to this new, zealous prosecution 
program, the common law presumption embodied in the “business 
judgment rule”22 regularly shielded directors and officers from liability for 
lax oversight practices, even with criminal activity running rampant 
throughout the corporation.23 Except in cases involving fraud, illegality, 
conflicts of interest, or gross negligence,24 courts would presume the 
decisions of corporate managers comported with their fiduciary duties 
owed to the corporation and its shareholders.25 As a result, shareholders 
seeking redress for failed corporate oversight would not be able to recover 
                                                                                                                         
18 Ewing et al., supra note 7.
19 Id.
20 Samantha Masunaga & Del Quentin Wilber, VW Engineer from California Pleads Guilty to 
Conspiracy in Emissions Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016, 2:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-volkswagen-engineer-20160909-snap-story.html
[https://www.perma.cc/F89X-7EPG].
21 Carey, supra note 15 (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jean Williams); see also 
Masunaga & Wilber, supra note 20 (predicting that Volkswagen employees cooperating with the U.S. 
Department of Justice means others will be charged); Gates et. al., supra note 8 (discussing the 
Volkswagen internal response).
22 For a general discussion of the business judgment rule under Delaware law, see
Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political 
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 132 (2014);
Michael R. Siebecker, The Duty of Care and Data Control Systems in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley,
84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 821, 825–26 (2010).
23 See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS, 17, 193 (2014) (describing how prosecutors may reveal malfeasance but subsequent 
punishments will rarely reform a firm’s management).
24 Michael R. Siebecker, Political Insider Trading, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2717, 2746 (2017).
25 See id. (noting the exceptions to the business judgment rule); Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Islands for Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1668–69 (2001) (describing how courts presume that managers serve 
fiduciary duties and shareholders except when conflicts of interest arise).
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even civil damages absent application of one of the business judgment rule 
exceptions.26
With respect to the duty of corporate managers to implement effective 
monitoring mechanisms to identify and stave off corporate wrongdoing, 
Delaware common law—which governs the vast majority of public 
companies in the United States—sets an incredibly low hurdle for directors 
and officers to overcome liability. Two prominent Delaware Supreme 
Court decisions, In re Caremark International27 and Stone v. Ritter,28 set 
forth the managerial baby steps directors and officers need to take to evade 
culpability. 
In Caremark, shareholders of a health-care company brought a 
derivative suit alleging directors violated their fiduciary duties in failing to 
uncover an illegal kickback scheme used by company employees that 
eventually led the company to plead guilty to felony criminal charges.29
In its determination that the board did not breach its fiduciary duties 
despite failing to detect and prevent the criminal misconduct, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery held “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board 
to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack 
of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”30 In Stone, where 
shareholders of a bank claimed its directors failed to identify and prevent 
corporate employees from violating federal anti-money-laundering laws, 
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Caremark standard.31
Articulating a willful ignorance of “red flags” exception, the Court added 
that liability could also arise when, after implementing a minimally 
compliant information gathering system, a board “consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”32
The “utter failure to attempt” threshold in Caremark and the 
“red flags” exception in Stone offer great insulation to officers and 
directors in the face of corporate criminality. At least as the contours of 
common law fiduciary duties are articulated in Delaware—by far the most 
important and influential corporate jurisdiction in the United States—
corporate officers and directors rarely faced personal civil, let alone 
                                                                                                                         
26 See Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate 
Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 215–16, 218–20, 222–23 (2010) (describing the business 
judgment rule exceptions and the difficulty shareholders face when pursuing these options).
27 In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
28 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
29 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
30 Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
31 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
32 Id.
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criminal, liability for corporate misdeeds.33 Quite to the contrary, 
potentially liable directors and officers have generally enjoyed a cozy 
relationship with government prosecutors.34 While individual executives 
certainly face intense media scrutiny in the midst of corporate scandals,35
those same high-ranking corporate agents receive significant incentives for
identifying institutional corporate wrongdoing in exchange for leniency 
regarding their individual complicity in the corporate crime.36
The shift in prosecutorial focus by the DOJ pursuant to the Yates 
Memo has created a substantial jurisprudential rift between federal 
standards for criminal prosecution of corporate agents and common law 
standards for fulfilling the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. As a 
result, the coziness between the government and ostensibly complicit 
corporate actors may indeed have come to an end. The changing tides 
result not simply from some attitudinal shift. Instead, the government now 
holds directors and officers to higher standards of oversight than the 
common law requires. Leniency for individual transgressions no longer 
comes with simple cooperation, but instead requires complete confession 
and compatriot implication. For instance, pursuant to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Manual that guides DOJ prosecutions, 
[compliance programs must be] established by corporate 
management to prevent and detect misconduct and to ensure 
that corporate activities are conducted in accordance with 
applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and rules . . . . 
However, the existence of a compliance program is not 
sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a 
corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by its 
officers, directors, employees, or agents.37
Moreover, the Yates Memo eliminates or severely restricts former 
officer and director safe havens such as corporate cooperation credits, 
individual plea-bargaining agreements, and the prioritization of 
prosecutions of companies over those that target individuals.38
The implications of this jurisprudential rift between federal 
prosecutorial and common law fiduciary standards are incredibly
                                                                                                                         
33 See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the importance of 
holding individuals accountable for corporate crime); Nees, supra note 26, at 215–24 (discussing the 
current state of director oversight liability).
34 Nees, supra note 26, at 215–24.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL 9-28.800 
(revised Nov. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-
business-organizations #9-28.800 [https://www.perma.cc/JLP5-3QYT].
38 Id.
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important. At the outset, for those directors and officers at the vast majority 
of public companies incorporated in Delaware, Caremark and Stone do not 
provide reliable guidance for avoiding civil or criminal liability. Those 
cases articulate the contours of corporate fiduciary duties far out of line 
with what federal prosecutors demand. In light of the Yates Memo, 
corporate counsel suggest that public company directors implement 
corporate compliance systems far more stringent than required under 
Delaware common law.39 In addition, were a director or officer to face 
criminal sanctions for failed oversight, the very existence of criminal 
liability would likely result in an exception to the business judgment rule’s 
application. As a result, what might have been a minimally compliant 
oversight system under the common law becomes actionable. Such bizarre 
circularity makes Delaware law jurisprudentially schizophrenic. To the 
extent Delaware common law duties fail to align with federal standards, 
the fiduciary duties surrounding corporate compliance risk becoming 
unworkable and ultimately irrelevant. Only by bending to match the reality 
of federal compliance standards can Delaware common law fiduciary 
duties remain relevant for guiding corporate managers. 
To assess why Delaware common law fiduciary duties must change to 
reflect heightened prosecutorial standards, Part I of this Article, 
“The Common Law of Compliance,” discusses the evolution of lax 
common law standards regarding corporate compliance that have provided 
ample protection to officers and directors even in cases of criminal 
wrongdoing. Part II, “Corporate Criminality in the Crosshairs,” describes 
the incremental shift in DOJ prosecutorial focus towards individual 
culpability resulting from numerous high-profile corporate scandals and 
increasing public demands for accountability. Part III, “Directorial Duties 
Redirected,” outlines three potential alternatives to Delaware’s current 
business judgment rule standards that would align common law fiduciary 
duties with the Yates Memo’s directives. Part IV, “Implications,” explores 
a variety of potential advantages and drawbacks to changing common law 
standards to comport with the reality of current prosecution policies. 
Finally, the Article concludes that redirecting Delaware common law 
fiduciary duties to follow federal prosecution standards will better ensure 
corporate accountability, reduce acts of corporate misconduct, and promote 
trust in the capital markets.
                                                                                                                         
39 See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine, Beyond Caremark: Individual and Corporate Liability 
Considerations, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 7, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/
compliance_enforcement/2016/12/07/beyond-caremark-individual-and-corporate-liability-
considerations [https://www.perma.cc/82KJ-4M65]; Michael Volkov, Corporate Directors in the 
Enforcement Cross-Hairs, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2016/03/corporate-directors-enforcement-cross-hairs/
[https://www.perma.cc/8JFG-8TPQ]; Woodcock & Sullivan, supra note 6.
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I. THE COMMON LAW OF COMPLIANCE
The Delaware court system has come to be known as the “Mother 
Court of corporate law.”40 More than 60% of Fortune 500 companies are 
incorporated in Delaware41 and since 2003, the state held nearly 75% of all 
initial public offerings in the United States.42 In fact, the number of public 
companies incorporated in Delaware is thirteen times more than the 
number of public companies incorporated in California, which is striking 
given that there are forty-three times more public companies headquartered 
in California than there are in Delaware.43 With this established 
prominence in the corporate field, Delaware offers significant and unique 
benefits for those companies that incorporate in that jurisdiction.44
One of the allures for these companies incorporating in Delaware is the 
manner in which the common law offers protection for directors and 
officers under the business judgment rule.45 The business judgment rule 
extends liability protection to officers and directors that act in good faith if 
their decisions are ultimately shown to be unsound or erroneous.46 The rule 
is based on the idea that business decisions should not be subject to 
after-the-fact second-guessing by judicial bodies because it would prevent 
officers and directors from taking the risks necessary to engage in 
business.47 In Delaware, the business judgment rule has been defined to 
                                                                                                                         
40 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv’s, Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990); Jerue v. Millett,
66 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2003); Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance 
Litigation: Section 220 Demands, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (2006).
41 Robert Hennelly, Is Delaware Home to a “Grand Corruption”?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-delaware-home-to-a-grand-corruption/ [https://www.perma.cc/ 
Y8XS-S562].
42 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 3:1 (2016) (citing William 
B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carney and 
Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 99
(2009)).
43 Id. (citing Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Mannis, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C.L. REV.
1049, 1055 (2015)). 
44 See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487/
[https://www.perma.cc/A6K6-EG7H] (explaining that corporations want to incorporate in the state of 
Delaware because the state’s Court of Chancery is favorable to business).
45 Id.
46 Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 521, 526–27 (2013).
47 McMillan, supra note 46 (citing In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009)); see also 
Alex Righi, Shareholders on Shaky Ground: Section 271’s Remaining Loophole, 108 NW. U.L. REV.
1451, 1464–65 (2014) (citing E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2005)) (“Delaware courts view the business judgment 
rule as ‘a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second guess, decision making by 
directors,’ unless there is clear cause to do so.”).
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“protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power 
granted to Delaware directors.”48
For the purposes of this article, the application of the business 
judgment rule in the context of business oversight and compliance is 
especially important and will serve as the primary topic of analysis. The 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Caremark International in 
1996 and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v. Ritter in 2006 
exemplify the business judgment rule’s benefits for directors and officers 
in relation to business oversight. 
Caremark and Stone also represent an extremely low threshold for 
directors and officers49 to achieve in order to avail themselves of the 
protections from liability under the business judgment rule for violations of 
state law. This standard permits those individuals to mount only minimal 
efforts in order to qualify for oversight protection and the benefit of 
Delaware’s generous business judgment rule protection. However, the 
Yates Memo represents a ground shift that demands much more from 
directors and officers than ever before. While the Yates Memo relates to 
federal enforcement authority, it is nevertheless important in guiding a
director’s or officer’s actions in performing oversight duties prior to any 
regulatory investigation. The Yates Memo is also important to determining 
a director’s or officer’s ability to avoid personal liability under both state 
and federal law. Accordingly, reviewing the current standards from 
Delaware courts in Caremark and Stone lays the foundation for an 
examination of the differences between the current, more lenient common 
law standard and the markedly more demanding investigatory and 
enforcement standards announced in the Yates Memo. 
                                                                                                                         
48 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1975); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1747–48 (2006).
49 It is important to note that the holdings in Caremark and Stone are not explicitly applicable to 
both directors and officers. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (applying standards of 
oversight to director conduct); In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (articulating 
only the directors’ duty of care standard without specific reference to officers). However, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held in 2009 that the Caremark standards of oversight apply not only to directors, but
also to officers. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009); see also Verity Winship, 
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1171, 1173 n.6 (2013) (citing Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708–09) (explaining that Gantler was the first case 
in which the equivalence of director and officer duty was explicitly stated by a court); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to 
Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 876 (2005) (arguing that the policies underlying the business 
judgment rule apply with “equal force” to both directors and officers); Darren Guttenberg, Note, 
Waiving Farewell Without Saying Goodbye: The Waiver of Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability 
Companies in Delaware, and the Call for Mandatory Disclosure, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 869, 877 n.31 
(2013) (reviewing case law suggesting that directors and officers are afforded the same presumption of 
competence under the business judgment rule).
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A. The Caremark Approach
In re Caremark International is widely considered to be the most 
important decision on directors’ liability for failing to act in accordance 
with their compliance and business oversight obligations.50 Caremark
involved a health-care company’s compliance with health-care regulations 
and its alleged involvement with “kickback” payments given to physicians 
in exchange for referrals to Caremark facilities.51 The alleged kickback 
scheme, if substantiated, would have violated Caremark’s policy against 
“quid pro quo” payments, as well as federal statutes which prohibited 
health-care providers from making payments for referral of Medicare or 
Medicaid patients.52 The company previously issued an internal manual to
govern employees entering into contracts with physicians and hospitals.53
The manual noted that no payments would be made in exchange or as a 
reward for referrals, but it was not clear whether other quid pro quo 
benefits were explicitly prohibited by the internal policy.54
Eventually, the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human 
Services Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) investigated Caremark 
for illegal kickback payments.55 The Caremark board then began a review 
of its internal policies and procedures, eventually producing a revised 
guide on contractual relationships with physicians—the updated guide 
established a policy of increased managerial oversight for these 
agreements, and added approval mechanisms accordingly.56 The board 
received reports on the investigation, continued to institute new policies, 
and increased its management supervision.57 However, the regulatory 
investigations culminated in a federal grand jury indictment charging 
Caremark and two of its officers with violating federal anti-kickback 
statutes.58 According to the indictment, the alleged kickback payments 
continued even after the board was alerted to the risks, in spite of its 
increased focus on compliance and internal training.59 Caremark eventually 
settled various state and federal matters against it60 by paying significant 
                                                                                                                         
50 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 10:4 
(3d ed. 2016); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 224 (3d ed. 2010) (describing 
Caremark as the “‘seminal modern case on directors’ liability for failure to act”).
51 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62. 
52 Id.
53 Id. at 962.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 963.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 963–64.
59 See id. (describing how the allegations of the indictment spanned the years in which Caremark 
was increasing its oversight and control over physician contracts).
60 Id. at 965–66.
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criminal and civil fines.61 The matter at issue for the court at trial was 
whether the proposed settlement of claims against Caremark was “fair to 
the corporation and its absent shareholders.”62 However, the underlying 
issues of importance to matters of corporate governance were: (1) under 
which standard Caremark’s directors and officers should be evaluated; and 
(2) whether these directors and officers failed to adequately supervise the 
conduct of the company’s employees or institute corrective measures that 
ultimately resulted in fines and penalties.63 In their complaint, shareholders 
alleged that the directors breached their “duty of attention or care” by 
allowing the situation to “develop and continue; [resulting in] enormous 
legal liability” stemming from their failure to actively monitor corporate 
performance.64
Ultimately, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the proposed 
settlement was fair for the company and the absent shareholders.65
However, more important to this analysis, the court held that when it 
pertains to board oversight, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack 
of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”66 In addition, the 
court also expanded upon its prior decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
stating that “absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards 
nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming 
the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the 
company’s behalf.”67
The holding in Caremark is extremely significant because of its 
instructive value for directors and officers in establishing their companies’ 
oversight and compliance systems. By the decision’s own terms, “[only] an 
utter failure to attempt” to oversee a company’s employees will result in 
liability for directors under the Delaware business judgment rule.68
Further, even in cases where the company is subject to criminal and civil 
discipline, the court will defer to the minimalist oversight functions that are 
instituted as sufficient, resulting in a significant benefit for high-level 
employees.69 The court’s standard requires no qualitative analysis of the 
                                                                                                                         
61 Id. at 965 n.10. 
62 Id. at 961. 
63 Id. at 967, 970–71.
64 Id. at 967. 
65 Id. at 972.
66 Id. at 971.
67 Id. at 969 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–31 (Del. 1963))
(holding that the Graham decision stood for the proposition stated above based on the court’s review in 
Caremark). 
68 Id. at 971.
69 Id.
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oversight measures, but simply offers a binary, “all or nothing” standard in 
which any effort to oversee the business operations is generally 
sufficient.70
The decision to insulate directors and officers from personal liability 
based on these facts is even more problematic considering the federal 
settlement Caremark agreed to the year before the decision was announced. 
As part of a separate series of settlements with the DOJ, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”), Caremark agreed to make various payments totaling 
approximately $250 million.71 Of that amount, $161 million of the 
settlement accounted for criminal fines, civil restitution, and damages for 
Caremark’s actions.72 At the time, it was the second-largest settlement ever 
recorded in the health-care industry.73
The DOJ would ultimately indict four Caremark employees,74
including its head of sales and marketing.75 While these four employees 
were later acquitted, they remained employed at Caremark during the legal 
proceedings and kept their jobs after the trial.76 As a result of the 
indictments’ announcement in August of 1994, Caremark’s publicly-traded 
shares dropped ten percentage points.77 Overall, the impact on Caremark 
was significant to its day-to-day business operations and its shareholders’ 
                                                                                                                         
70 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. The “utter failure to attempt” standard outlined in Caremark
permits companies to skirt qualitative analysis beyond answering the binary question of whether there 
was an attempt to provide oversight or not. This results in an “all or nothing” compromise where a
company that engages in a form of oversight will benefit from the business judgment rule and vice 
versa. 
71 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Caremark to Pay $161 Million in Fraud and Kickback 
Cases (June 16, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/Pre_96/June95/342.txt.html
[https://www.perma.cc/Q82K-KS2X].
72 Id.




74 It is important to note that no officer-level executives or directors were indicted. See Jan 
Crawford Greenburg, Healthy Penalties in Caremark Fraud Case, CHI. TRIB. (June 17, 1995), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-06-17/news/9506170105_1_health-care-fraud-caremark-
international-government-medical-programs [https://www.perma.cc/622L-YXNZ]; see also Hillary A. 
Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 726 (2007) (“Importantly, no senior 
officers of directors were cited for wrongdoing . . . . ”).
75 Day, supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 See Milt Freudenheim, Caremark Is Indicted in Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/05/business/company-news-caremark-is-indicted-in-
kickbacks.html?mcubz=1 [https://www.perma.cc/X4CK-FFN3] (“Caremark's shares fell $2.375 . . . to 
$21.125, in heavy trading on the New York Stock Exchange . . . .”).
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financial interests, yet none of the executives or officers were found 
individually culpable for their acts or omissions by the Delaware court.78
While the chronology of the case shows that the DOJ’s indictments 
took place prior to Delaware’s legal proceedings, the fact that the outcomes 
were so different is telling. The court’s decision offers little analysis on the 
Caremark board’s oversight actions aside from a brief mention of the 
board’s awareness of the pending investigations and the finding that once 
the issues were identified, the board took action by updating its guides and 
increasing its policy to demand more regular reporting and oversight on the 
matter to supervisors.79 For ten years after the decision in Caremark,
directors and officers took solace in the fact that the business judgment rule 
would protect them if they mounted even minimal efforts at oversight. 
Then, the Delaware Supreme Court offered its decision in Stone and 
further galvanized these protections.80
B. Stone: Reaffirming Caremark and Then Some 
A decade after Caremark, the Delaware Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Stone, which clarified a number of lingering questions about 
director oversight liability.81 The case came to the Delaware Supreme 
Court as an appeal from the Chancery Court’s decision dismissing a 
shareholder’s derivative complaint against current and former directors for 
their failure to stop a money-laundering scheme that resulted in significant 
penalties and fines incurred by the defendant banking corporation, 
AmSouth.82
The facts of the case were largely unimportant in Stone and the 
Delaware Supreme Court apportioned the majority of the opinion to 
analyzing the Chancery Court’s prior decision in the Caremark case.83
Ultimately, the court held that the Chancery Court’s holding in Caremark
reflected the correct standard for boards of directors seeking business 
                                                                                                                         
78 Sale, supra note 74, at 726–27. 
79 See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Caremark’s Board took several 
additional steps consistent with an effort to assure compliance with company policies concerning the 
ARPL and the contractual forms in the Guide. In April 1992, Caremark published a fourth revised 
version of its Guide apparently designed to assure that its agreements either complied with the ARPL 
and regulations or excluded Medicare and Medicaid patients altogether. In addition, in September 
1992, Caremark instituted a policy requiring its regional officers, Zone Presidents, to approve each 
contractual relationship entered into by Caremark with a physician.”).
80 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006).
81 Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter and the 
Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 431,      
431–33, 437 (2009) (discussing how the longstanding debate was settled and observing that “[t]he 
Stone court finally cleared up some doctrinal issues when it explicitly stated that good faith is not a 
freestanding duty on the level of care and loyalty”). 
82 Stone, 911 A.2d at 364–65, 373. 
83 Id. at 364–65, 367–70.
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judgment rule protection in relation to oversight liability.84 In adopting the 
Caremark rule, the court expanded its position on the necessary conditions 
for director oversight.85 In order to be culpable under a director oversight 
theory, a director must either: (1) utterly fail to implement any reporting 
information system or controls as stated under Caremark; or (2) “having 
implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail[] to monitor or 
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of 
risks or problems requiring their attention.”86 Importantly, the court held 
that in either case, the directors must know that they are “not discharging 
their fiduciary obligations” in order to be liable for failing to provide 
proper oversight.87 Only then, when “the directors fail to act in the face of 
a known duty to act . . . demonstrating a conscious disregard for their 
responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge 
that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”88
In applying this “red flags” exception to the case, the Stone court found 
that the plaintiffs did not plead the existence of any facts that otherwise 
indicated that the AmSouth directors were aware that AmSouth’s internal 
controls were incapable of stopping the illegal activity.89 The court noted 
the Chancery Court’s findings in the case were correct: the directors’ 
oversight actions were sufficient and their failure to affirmatively detect 
the illegal activity did not meet the Caremark standard for culpability.90
Therefore, the directors were not personally liable for the 
money-laundering scheme that occurred under their watch and they 
executed their obligations in fulfillment of the proper standards.91
In sharp contrast to the findings of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Stone, the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”), Federal Reserve’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), and the Alabama Banking 
Department found that AmSouth’s board did indeed fall short when 
executing its oversight responsibilities.92 The federal government found 
that AmSouth relied on misrepresentations by the actors involved in the 
money-laundering scheme and failed to file the requisite documents 
according to federal law.93
While the USAO opted to not hold any individual officer or director 
culpable specifically, FinCEN found that “AmSouth’s [compliance] 
                                                                                                                         
84 Id. at 369–70.




89 Id. at 370–71.
90 Id. at 372–73.
91 Id. at 373.
92 Id. at 366. 
93 Id.
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program lacked adequate board and management oversight” and “reporting 
to management for the purposes of monitoring and oversight of compliance 
activities was materially deficient.”94 Nevertheless, the government did not 
fine or sanction AmSouth’s individual directors at the conclusion of its 
investigation.95 Instead, it opted to pursue fines and penalties against the 
corporation itself.96
C. The Legacy of Caremark and Stone
When considered against the Delaware courts’ standards, the facts in 
Caremark and Stone represent instances where the board exceeded the 
requisite obligations to qualify for the protection of the business judgment 
rule.97 However, both of the defendant companies suffered meaningful 
losses in the related civil and criminal settlements under federal law.98
For shareholders, the outcomes in these proceedings stand as an affront to 
the very essence of what directors and officers are charged to do.99
According to the investigatory outcomes from the federal government, 
these individuals failed to identify wrongdoing and act in the best interest 
of the shareholders.100
                                                                                                                         
94 Id. at 366. 
95 Id. at 365.
96 Id.
97 See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Here the record supplies 
essentially no evidence that the director defendants were guilty of a sustained failure to exercise their 
oversight function. To the contrary, insofar as I am able to tell on this record, the corporation’s
information systems appear to have represented a good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts. If 
the directors did not know the specifics of the activities that lead to the indictments, they cannot be 
faulted.”); Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73 (“[T]he Board received and approved relevant policies and 
procedures, delegated to certain employees and departments the responsibility for filing SARs and 
monitoring compliance, and exercised oversight by relying on periodic reports from them. Although 
there ultimately may have been failures by employees to report deficiencies to the Board, there is no 
basis for an oversight claim seeking to hold the directors personally liable for such failures by the 
employees.”).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 71–73 (describing the $161 settlement as the second largest 
settlement in the health-care industry); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 365 (noting AmSouth and AmSouth 
Bank paid out $40 million and $10 million in civil penalties).
99 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith 
and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2008) (citing Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment 
Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984)) (noting 
that “most of what boards do ‘does not consist of taking affirmative action on individual matters’ but 
rather consists of a ‘continuing flow of supervisory process’”); id. (citing Jonathan L. Johnson et. al., 
Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409, 411 (1996)) (finding that 
“[m]onitoring the performance of corporate management is not just one of the board’s three principal 
functions, it is, arguably, prima inter pares”). 
100 Stone, 911 A.2d at 366 (“FinCEN found that AmSouth violated the suspicious activity 
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, and that . . . AmSouth has been in violation of the 
anti-money-laundering program requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Among FinCEN’s specific 
determinations were its conclusions that AmSouth’s [AML compliance] program lacked adequate 
board and management oversight, and that reporting to management for the purposes of monitoring and 
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Yet the Delaware court found that these same individuals properly 
executed their business oversight obligations.101 For directors and officers, 
the ability to avoid personal liability when their company and company’s 
shareholders suffer financial losses is problematic. Perhaps these officers 
and directors eventually lost their positions or had difficulties in securing 
future jobs from the reputational impact of the scandals, but by that time,
the damage to the companies and shareholders was already done. To find 
that these individuals suffered no (or minimal) direct personal 
ramifications from the misbehavior that occurred under their watch 
underscores the dysfunctional nature of these Delaware standards. 
However, as mentioned above, the decisions remain good law and, in the 
case of Caremark specifically, academics and practitioners alike revere the 
decisions for their precedential value and longstanding functionality.102
The fact that the directors and officers suffered no personal liability 
even at the hands of federal regulators that found the companies culpable 
overall may have been reassuring in earlier times. This result reflects the 
federal regulatory regime and its priorities during a period when businesses 
were extended the benefit of the doubt.103 However, with the advent of 
more stringent investigatory and enforcement standards under the 
Yates Memo, the oversight obligations under these two cases must evolve 
to better prepare companies and their decision makers to act 
prophylactically by: (1) designing and implementing effective oversight 
policies and procedures; (2) engaging in proactive review of the 
investigatory functions; and (3) when problems are discovered, taking
definitive steps to remedy the situation. 
While Caremark and Stone achieve the Delaware courts’ goal of 
establishing a duty of oversight while simultaneously avoiding excessive 
judicial interference with the boardroom decision-making process, the 
decisions do not provide adequate direction to compel directors and 
officers to actively and authoritatively protect companies from misconduct. 
The Caremark duty to oversee legal compliance is not sufficiently specific 
to demand active director oversight of investigations. Further, it permits 
timid or self-preserving directors to avoid clashes with management that 
                                                                                                                         
oversight of compliance activities was materially deficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Press Release, supra note 71 (“Caremark agreed to plead guilty to two one-count informations charging 
that it defrauded federal health-care programs by making improper payments to induce doctors and 
other professionals to refer patients to Caremark.”). 
101 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971–72; Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73.
102 Sale, supra note 74, at 720–21, 755.
103 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 773, 793–94 (2004) (noting that a climate supportive of the idea that “businesses-can-do-
no-wrong” permitted Enron and companies like it to overpower regulatory measures). 
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could otherwise prevent costly investigations and legal proceedings in the 
future.104
One could argue, anecdotally, that since the advent of these oversight 
decisions under Delaware law, we have seen numerous instances of 
companies committing culpable actions that might have been stopped 
under a more rigorous oversight regime. In 2015, 66% of all Fortune 500 
companies were incorporated under Delaware law, a figure that is up from 
58% in 2000.105 This represents a significant percentage of American
businesses and, presumably, a number of these entities engaged in illegal 
conduct during this time. Additionally, Delaware judges are among the 
most renowned experts in business law.106 Therefore, given its unique 
insight into complex business law, Delaware should be leading the pack to 
shift its policies as the federal government seeks to target individuals at an 
unprecedented rate. 
The idea that Delaware must strike a balance between having legal 
standards that reflect pro-business principles on the one hand, and 
providing some means of redress for shareholders after acts of misconduct 
on the other, has been called into question in recent years.107 The scandals 
of Enron,108 WorldCom,109 Tyco,110 Volkswagen,111 and Wells Fargo112 all 
                                                                                                                         
104 Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty 
to Monitor 4–5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., Paper No. 160, 2008), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/160/
[https://www.perma.cc/7NBW-VAST].
105 JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORP., DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2015
ANNUAL REPORT (2015), https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/E99M-VFXW].
106 Semuels, supra note 44.
107 See id. (noting Delaware has “little desire to change its laws to make them more employee-
friendly”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1590 (2005) (noting that Delaware “cannot effectively 
regulate certain types of misconduct”).
108 See WILLIAM C. POWERS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 22 (2002), 
http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.report/powers.report.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/B8HU-
PKRK] (determining the Enron Board of Directors failed in its oversight duties); see also S. REP. NO.
107-70, at 3, 13–14, 23 (2002), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT80393/pdf/CPRT-
107SPRT80393.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/P2BJ-5JGC] (concluding that the Enron Board of Directors 
failed to safeguard Enron shareholders).
109 See DENNIS R. BERESFORD, NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH & C.B. ROGERS, JR., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
WORLDCOM, INC. 30–33 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/0000931763030
01862/dex991.htm [https://www.perma.cc/2V7C-57VC] (concluding “[t]he Board and its Committees 
did not function in a way that made it likely that they would notice red flags”); DICK THORNBURGH,
FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT EXAMINER IN RE: WORLDCOM,
INC., ET. AL., (2002), http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf [https://www. 
perma.cc/YPA8-L5K6] (noting the Audit Committee “did not appear to operate effectively”).
110 See Joann S. Lublin & Jerry Guidera, Tyco’s Board Is Criticized for Kozlowski Dealings,
WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023407877377626960 
[https://www.perma.cc/9VNS-26N8] (noting experts generally agreed the board was “far too 
unquestioning” and lacked sufficient oversight); William C. Symonds, Commentary: Tyco: How Did 
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reflect corporate decision-making environments where there was only 
minimal oversight. In response to these scandals, the federal government 
has acted in kind by attempting to change the rules of the game to facilitate 
better regulation and ultimately prevent misbehavior. Congress held 
hearings and ultimately passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.113 The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has adopted new regulations and 
guidance since the early 2000s in an ongoing attempt to accelerate 
corporate oversight reform.114 Even individual states passed new laws or 
sought criminal charges against executives that took part in the scandals.115
All the while, Delaware common law remains largely unchanged.116
The bases of its legal standards have stayed the same over the past two 
decades while the federal regulatory standards have experienced an 
extensive overhaul.117 This may be a result of the institutional mechanisms 
at work in Delaware. The courts’ and legislature’s most powerful 
constituents are the businesses that pay handsomely to incorporate within 
the state.118 As evidence of the power corporations wield within the state, 
Delaware’s Division of Corporations general fund revenue topped 
$1 billion in 2015, which accounts for 26% of the State of Delaware’s 
                                                                                                                         
They Miss a Scam So Big?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2002), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2002-09-29/commentary-tyco-how-did-they-miss-a-scam-
so-big [https://www.perma.cc/7K8P-N826] (commenting that the scandal would not have occurred had 
the board’s oversight been adequate).
111 See James B. Stewart, Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/problems-at-
volkswagen-start-in-the-boardroom.html [https://www.perma.cc/Qm8Q-GJWD] (noting a scandal was 
“all but inevitable” due, in part, to its “clannish board”); Patrick Ambrosio, Volkswagen Executives 
Implicated in Diesel-Cheating Scandal, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 19, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/volkswagen-executives-implicated-b73014445007
[https://www.perma.cc/MR5Y-B5H5] (noting there were “years of illegal activity that dozens of 
employees, corporate officers, and senior executives were aware of”).
112 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pervasive Sham Deals at Wells Fargo, and No One Noticed?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/business/dealbook/pervasive-
sham-deals-at-wells-fargo-and-no-one-noticed.html [https://www.perma.cc/QK72-MHHA] 
(highlighting the disconnect between what the CEO “was telling the public and what was actually 
going on”); Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-
fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html?mcubz=0 [https://www.perma.cc/W4BH-G8L2] (noting the 
scandal “reflected serious flaws in the . . . oversight at Wells Fargo”).





118 In 2015, Delaware registered 480 companies per day and as of 2016, Delaware was home to 
more businesses (around 1.1 million) than residents (around 935,000). David Kocieniewski, 
Delaware’s $1 Billion Incorporation Machine, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2016) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/delaware-s-1-billion-opacity-industry-gives-u-s-
onshore-haven [https://www.perma.cc/2DXH-37EF].
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general fund revenue.119 This money comes directly from those companies 
that must pay business incorporation costs, taxes, and franchise fees in 
order to operate as Delaware companies.120 Further, the court system is 
known for addressing controversy only when it is presented with a legal 
dispute on point in order to provide continuity.121 However, Delaware 
continues to move forward without implementing overarching changes; 
instead, it offers methodical, incremental shifts over many years.122
From one perspective, Delaware may need to react soon to the 
changing tides or face the prospect of becoming irrelevant in the realm of 
director and officer oversight. As these acts of corporate malfeasance 
continue, it becomes increasingly likely that the Delaware common law 
oversight standards will fall upon deaf ears because they fail to effectuate 
adequate protection for the entity and its shareholders.123 The common law 
may also be found to represent such a low bar when it comes to business 
oversight that it no longer has its intended legal value of establishing 
standards of behavior.124
Some commentators argue that Caremark already represents an 
irrelevant standard due to the fact that federal regulatory policy already 
established new, more rigorous requirements that make Delaware common 
law standards a mere afterthought.125 In his article, Mercer Bullard argues 
that despite its “iconic status,” Caremark plays only a small role in the 
application of corporate compliance programs because rational corporate 
actors seek to mitigate the risks that result in the greatest cost.126 From 
Bullard’s perspective, rational corporate actors are more likely to analyze 
oversight obligation decisions as one would evaluate free-market forces.127
Under this theory, the Delaware courts’ decisions in Caremark and Stone
offer negligible guidance because the ultimate standards by which directors 
and officers are judged under federal regulatory law are much more 
                                                                                                                         
119 Bullock, supra note 105; see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 694 (2002) (“Delaware residents derive financial gains from 
providing professional services to public corporations incorporated in the state.”) 
120 Semuels, supra note 44.
121 Kahan & Rock, supra note 107, at 1617.
122 Id. at 1576. Part of the reason for this slow evolution of Delaware law is its lack of competition 
from other state corporate courts. This preeminence is based on a number of “political and economic 
factors” including a specialized business court and its “extensive and widely known corporate case 
law.” Kahan & Kamar, supra note 119, at 725–26.
123 Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 19 (2013).
124 See id. at 20 (noting administrative guidelines are more motivating than common law liability);
see also Julian J. Z. Polaris, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balance Specificity and Ambiguity in 
Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 262–63 (2014) (“Boards have a fiduciary duty to 
monitor for illegal conduct, but the monitoring system need only comport with the minimally adequate 
standard of the business judgment rule.”).
125 See Bullard, supra note 123, at 19–20.
126 Id. at 16.
127 Id. at 19. 
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imposing.128 While Bullard’s thesis may give some directors and officers 
more credit for their decision-making rationales than they deserve, the 
ultimate outcome is instructive: a director or officer that conforms his 
behavior to anything but the highest applicable standards leaves his 
company, and arguably himself, vulnerable to subsequent legal action. 
While it remains unclear whether Delaware will ultimately change 
course and adapt to the changing regulatory environment, the court’s 
prominent reputation stands to suffer if its decisions lack meaningful 
application to companies and their decision makers. The outcomes in the 
criminal prosecutions for the entities in Caremark and Stone support this 
assertion. Thus, it is with this mindset that we must evaluate just how the 
federal regulatory environment continues to evolve and incorporate more 
stringent standards for seeking personal liability, as it is likely that such 
standards are increasingly at odds with those found in Delaware. 
II. CORPORATE CRIMINALITY IN THE CROSSHAIRS
The Yates Memo is the product of a regulatory environment that 
increasingly focused on the need for more criminal liability for corporate 
officers and executives in the face of scandal.129 During that time, at least 
twenty-six Fortune 100 corporations were subject to federal criminal 
investigations.130 However, instead of those investigations resulting in 
prison sentences for individual directors and officers of the companies, 
they largely resulted in the execution of non-prosecution agreements, 
deferred-prosecution agreements, or plea agreements.131
                                                                                                                         
128 Id.
129 See Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum and the Federal 
Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 899,
901–02 (2016) (noting that the DOJ was heavily criticized for not holding individuals criminally liable 
despite securing significant amounts of money through fines and penalties for corporate entity 
misbehavior). 
130 Id.
131 Id.; see also, e.g., The Yates Memo, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-yates-memo/ [https://www.perma.cc/7SBA-2AQT] (stating that 
between 2008 and 2014, 75% of corporate enforcement actions stemming from the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act failed to include charges against individual defendants); see also Michael C. Gross, 
Carolyn H. Kendall & Aaron S. Mapes, Will Volkswagen Executives Be the Yates Memo’s First 
Casualties?, BLOOMBERG BNA, 2 (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.postschell.com/site/files/post__
schell__will_volkswagen_executives_be_the_yates_memos_first_casualties__bloomberg_bna__dec_1
5.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/FM7U-QKZF] (citing the Deferred Prosecution Agreements for 
JPMorgan Chase Bank from January 6, 2015, and General Motors Co. from September 17, 2015, as 
examples demonstrating that the government “has pursued only the company and resolved the case 
through a non- or deferred prosecution agreement imposing substantial corporate financial penalties but 
no jail time for executives”).  
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For the DOJ, agreeing to alternative forms of punishment allowed it to 
collect extensive fines and effectuate other headline-grabbing penalties,132
but it failed in its overarching goal to secure more criminal liability in a 
crusade that has stretched the administrations of multiple presidents and 
numerous Attorneys General.133 The Yates Memo stands to change this 
dynamic by emphasizing individual liability without reducing the attention 
afforded to prosecutions of culpable entities.134 As such, the Yates Memo 
signals a shift from the more entity-centric prosecutions of the past to 
incorporate a more individual-focused model moving forward.135 In order 
to best analyze this movement, the Yates Memo must be reviewed against 
its predecessors to determine if the DOJ is indeed signaling a pending 
ground shift in policy to which corporations nationwide should react. 
A. Federal Targeting of Corporate Wrongdoing
The custom of composing DOJ memos by sitting Deputy Attorneys 
General appears to have started with then-Deputy Attorney General Eric 
Holder in 1999.136 Since then, many—but not all—Deputy Attorneys 
General have used the eponymous memo-writing process to announce 
                                                                                                                         
132 See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects 
More than $15.3 Billion in Civil and Criminal Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-collects-more-153-billion-civil-and-criminal-cases-
fiscal-year-2016 [https://www.perma.cc/SJR6-WV2X] (noting that the DOJ’s collections in FY 2016 
ending on September 30, 2016, totaled $15.3 billion and “represent[] more than five times the 
approximately $3 billion appropriated budget” for the department generally); Press Release, Office of 
Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects More than $23 Billion in Civil and 
Criminal Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
collects-more-23-billion-civil-and-criminal-cases-fiscal-year-2015 [https://www.perma.cc/U3R4-8SZJ] 
(noting that the DOJ’s collections in FY 2015 ending on September 30, 2015, totaled $23 billion, 
including an $8.2 billion settlement in August with Bank of America for its actions leading up to the 
2008 financial crisis). 
133 See, e.g., Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads 
of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [https:/www.perma.cc/YA64-
JRKX] (noting that the DOJ policy to hold individuals accountable for corporate misconduct has been 
in place for many years). The Filip Memo, released in 2008, noted: “Where a decision is made to 
charge a corporation, it does not necessarily follow that individual directors, officers, employees, or 
shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the 
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation.” Id.
134 Yates, supra note 1.
135 See id. at 4 (“[B]y focusing on individuals from the very beginning of an investigation, we 
maximize the chances that the final resolution of an investigation uncovering the misconduct will 
include civil or criminal charges against not just the corporation but against culpable individuals as 
well.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1794 (2015)
(citing a new DOJ memorandum “amending its guidelines to reflect a focus on individual 
accountability for corporate crimes”).
136 Jim Letten & Carol Montgomery, The Yates Memo: What New Challenges to Expect, LAW 360
(Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/738741/the-yates-memo-what-new-challenges-to-
expect [https://www.perma.cc/XP85-HHLM].
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general policies and identify any long-term goals.137 All the while, the 
political environment in Washington, D.C., continues to change, making it 
difficult to determine if the priorities under one administration will carry 
on to the next. Along those lines, despite a fear by some that the Trump 
Administration might not take prosecution of individual corporate 
wrongdoers seriously,138 Attorney General Jeff Sessions vowed in April 
2016 that “[t]he Department of Justice will continue to emphasize the 
importance of holding individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.
It is not merely companies, but specific individuals, who break the law. We
will work closely with our law enforcement partners, both here and abroad, 
to bring these persons to justice.”139 Therefore, despite the inevitable 
degree of uncertainty regarding how vigorously the current or any 
subsequent administration might adhere to long-term policy commitments 
embodied in prior DOJ memos, a brief review of those DOJ memos over 
the past twenty years uncovers some key principles that animate prevailing 
prosecutorial practices.
1. The Holder Memo (1999) 
The Holder Memo stemmed from the efforts of a working group 
coordinated by the DOJ that also included representatives from the 
                                                                                                                         
137 See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/S6UR-K5V4] (offering guidance regarding marijuana enforcement); 
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected U.S. Att’ys 
(Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-
marijuana.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/BY2L-ADUZ] (announcing formal guidelines for federal 
prosecutors in states that authorize the medical use of marijuana); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12, 
2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/7SYX-YJYL] (offering guidance on DOJ policy regarding the prosecution of 
business organizations). The foregoing examples demonstrate that numerous former Deputy Attorneys
General have issued memorandums to announce new Department of Justice policies. 
138 See, e.g., Bethany McLean, Why White-Collar Crooks May Be Cheering This Jeff Sessions 
Memo, YAHOO FINANCE (Mar. 21, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-white-collar-crooks-
may-be-cheering-this-jeff-sessions-memo-133115487.html [https://www.perma.cc/57QX-628S] 
(noting that Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s March 8 memo “directs prosecutors to focus not on 
corporate crime, but on violent crime”). 
139 Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative 
Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
delivers-remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-annual [https://www.perma.cc/HQL2-CYLT]; see
also Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax Enforcement for White-
Collar Offenses, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/sessions-focus-on-violent-crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collar-
offenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html?nid&utm_term=.510697
7a04a5/ [https://www.perma.cc/PE4Z-F8EZ] (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions vowed Monday not to 
diminish the Justice Department’s focus on corporate fraud, asserting that a vigorous interest in violent 
crime would not diminish its long-standing mission to prosecute white-collar offenders.”).
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USAO.140 While the Holder Memo was the DOJ’s first statement on how 
to create uniform guidelines on corporate prosecution,141 it received little 
fanfare initially because the United States was thriving economically and 
prosecuting corporations was not “en vogue.”142 Nevertheless, Holder 
drafted the Holder Memo in response to complaints about the lack of a 
uniform approach to charging corporations for their misbehavior.143
The Holder Memo included eight factors to guide prosecutors’ analysis 
of whether to bring charges against a corporation in a particular case.144
As such, the memo and the factors therein were not compulsory.145 The 
memo highlighted the deterrence value of bringing suit against 
corporations and the idea that setting an example will ultimately lead to a 
change in the culture of indicted corporations and their employees.146
The primary focus of the memo was to provide guidance on the 
prosecution of corporations, and importantly, it included a reminder in 
Section I, subsection (B) that “[c]harging a corporation, however, does not 
mean that individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders should 
not also be charged.”147 The memo went on to note that corporations alone 
do not engage in criminal conduct and are only culpable for acts of natural 
persons.148 Therefore, the acts of management personnel of culpable 
corporations should be analyzed, but very little guidance was offered in 
determining if individuals should be formally prosecuted.149
It is also important to note that the Holder Memo intended to direct 
line prosecutors to follow specific guidance on how to prioritize DOJ 
policies and determine when to be lenient with corporations under 
                                                                                                                         
140 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Att’ys 1 (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://www.perma.cc/SN27-46X8] (noting that the ad 
hoc working group included USAO members, the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, and Divisions 
within the Department with criminal law enforcement responsibilities).
141 Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal 
Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 945 n.167 (2009) (citing Lawrence D. Finder, Internal 
Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111,
113–14 (2003)).
142 Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1449 (2007).
143 Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal Corporate Charging 
Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 190 n.133 (2016) (citing Peter Lattman, The Holder 
Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-
memo/ [https://www.perma.cc/KFB9-2YM7]). 
144 Holder, supra note 140, at 3.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2.
147 See id. at 2–3 (stating that prosecutors should evaluate the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing 
within the corporation, including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate 
management”). 
148 Id. at 4.
149 Id.
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investigation.150 While the eight factors informed prosecutors’ decisions of 
whether to bring charges,151 they also suggested that corporate prosecutions 
could be deferred if the corporation took appropriate steps to prevent the 
wrongdoing.152 Specifically, the factors focused on the “pervasiveness of 
the wrongdoing” within the organization,153 the corporation’s “timely and 
voluntary disclosure” of wrongdoing and cooperation in the 
investigation,154 “the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s
compliance program,”155 and the corporation’s attempts to remedy the 
situation by creating or improving its compliance program or addressing 
personnel issues.156 Together, these factors largely focused on the ability of 
a corporation to limit its own criminal liability and, at least contextually, it 
appeared that the criminal prosecution of individual actors was a 
second-tier priority.
2. The Thompson Memo (2003) 
Shortly after the release of the Holder Memo, the economic prosperity 
enjoyed throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s gave way to a series of 
serious public accounting scandals involving economic powers such as 
Enron and WorldCom.157 These scandals and others that came to light 
during this period made it evident that further reforms were needed in the 
area of corporate prosecutions.158 Specifically, the DOJ sought to address a 
pervasive corporate culture determined to make profits at all costs.159
Based on these concerns, sitting Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 
composed the Thompson Memo by amending the Holder Memo’s initial
directives.160
                                                                                                                         
150 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 968 n.122,
969 (2009) (citing Michael Siegel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (“Prior to 1998, DOJ had no set policy 
regarding the prosecution of corporations . . . .”)). 
151 Holder, supra note 140, at 3.
152 See id. at 3 (stating that what the company is doing to correct its behaviors should be taken 
under consideration when deciding how to proceed with a corporate target); see also Baer, supra note
150, at 968–69.




157 Paulsen, supra note 142, at 1449–50.
158 See id. at 1450 (stating that after a series of corporate crimes were committed, the DOJ 
reprioritized how it dealt with corporate crimes).
159 Id.
160 Beth A. Wilkinson & Alex Young K. Oh, The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations: A Ten-Year Anniversary Perspective, 27 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N INSIDE 8;  see Amsler, 
supra note 143 (stating that the Thompson Memo was published in 2003 as part of a renewed effort by 
the Department of Justice).
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The Thompson Memo emphasized the concept of corporate 
cooperation during the investigatory process.161 Specifically, the memo 
sought to increase the quality and authenticity of a corporation’s 
cooperation when the federal government investigated it for 
wrongdoing.162 At issue was the fact that many corporations cooperated 
facially with investigations while behind the scenes they were intentionally 
impeding investigations altogether.163 The memo stated that corporations 
that do offer timely, voluntary, and truthful disclosures should benefit in 
order to encourage adherence to the policy.164
Additionally, the Thompson Memo escalated the Holder Memo’s eight 
factors from optional guidelines165 to binding requirements.166 The 
Thompson Memo also added a ninth factor to be considered: “the 
adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the 
corporation’s malfeasance.”167 This ninth factor indicated that the DOJ 
intended to include the severity of punishment incurred by individuals in 
the consideration of the entity’s culpability and vice versa. Boosting the 
emphasis on individual liability, the memo also stated that only in rare 
situations would individuals not be pursued, even if a corporation offered
to plead guilty.168
The Thompson Memo represented a significant shift because it 
coincided with both a simultaneous rise in the number of prosecutions of 
the United States’ largest public companies and an ever-more hostile 
                                                                                                                         
161 Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of 




163 See id. at 6–8 (providing examples such as broad assertions, directions to employees to not 
cooperate, and incomplete production of records).
164 See id. at 3, 6–8 (stating that in some instances, immunity or amnesty is considered when a 
corporation voluntarily discloses information). 
165 See Holder, supra note 140, at 1 (“Federal prosecutors are not required to reference these 
factors in a particular case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded specific factors 
in reaching their decision.”). 
166 See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal 
prosecutors.”); id. at 338 n.12 (“The Thompson Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal 
prosecutors must consider in determining whether to charge a corporation or other business 
organization.” (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 163 (2005)));
see also John Power, Show Me the Money: The Thompson Memo, Stein, and an Employee’s Right to 
the Advancement of Legal Fees Under the McNulty Memo, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2007) 
(“Unlike the Holder Memo, intended only to provide guidance, the Thompson Memo was binding on 
all federal prosecutors.”).
167 Thompson, supra note 161, at 3.
168 See id. at 1 (“Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, even in the 
face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.”).
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regulatory environment.169 The DOJ incorporated the nine factors 
identified in the memo in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual in response to 
“concerns regarding attorney-client privilege and corporate payment of 
attorney’s fees.”170 The Thompson Memo’s drafting process also reflected 
a more holistic effort politically. Less than six months before the release of 
the Thompson Memo, President George W. Bush established his Corporate 
Fraud Task Force “in order to strengthen the efforts of the Department of 
Justice and . . . to investigate and prosecute significant financial 
crimes . . . .”171 President Bush’s Corporate Fraud Task Force worked 
closely with the DOJ and the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to 
draft the Thompson Memo.172
With this growing momentum, prosecutors interpreted the memo as an 
implied grant of power to reach further than they had previously in order to 
secure cooperation.173
This emphasis on cooperation manifested itself under the application 
of the fourth factor due to its relation to the waiver of attorney-client 
privilege and work product protection.174 The Thompson Memo noted that 
frequently “business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a 
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effect 
exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.”175
To combat these issues, the memo listed four sub-factors under the fourth 
factor on cooperation, including the corporation’s willingness to:
(1) “identify the culprits within the corporation”; (2) “make witnesses 
available”; (3) “disclose complete results of its internal investigation”; and 
(4) “waive attorney-client privilege and work product protection.”176
These sub-factors were the source of significant criticism, especially 
given their implications on “the rights, privileges, and interests of the 
corporation and those of its employees.”177 Ultimately, the Thompson 
Memo faced immense backlash from a variety of sources alleging that the 
                                                                                                                         
169 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions,
101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 63 (2016) (noting that the guidelines for corporations shifted from a more 
lenient structure under the Leniency Program to a strict structure under the Thompson Memo). 
170 Id. at 63–64.
171 Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 11, 2002).
172 See Thompson, supra note 161 (stating that the DOJ worked in conjunction with the Corporate 
Fraud Task Force and the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to create the memorandum).
173 See Baer, supra note 150, at 969–70 (“The Thompson Memorandum’s ostensible guidance to 
prosecutors was understood as the government’s attempt to flex its muscle and force corporations to 
hand over otherwise protected documents . . . .”); Schipani, supra note 141, at 948 (“[T]he Thompson 
Memorandum shifts the prosecutor’s focus further to the evaluation of cooperation.”).
174 Thompson, supra note 161, at 3 (“[T]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, 
the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection . . . .”).
175 Id. at i.
176 Id. at 6.
177 Schipani, supra note 141, at 949.
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DOJ was abusing its power by compromising protected legal rights.178
The American Civil Liberties Union, American Bar Association, National 
Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
combined to lobby against the measures.179 Senator Arlen Spector 
introduced new legislation that would amend the DOJ’s policy under the 
Thompson Memo.180 Due to the pressure, the DOJ finally released a new 
memo in 2006.181
3. The McNulty Memo (2006)182
Paul McNulty, the Deputy Attorney General from 2005 to 2006,183
announced a policy shift in the way that the attorney-client privilege 
waiver was handled by the DOJ and the USAO under the Thompson 
Memo.184 The McNulty Memo followed significant criticism of the 
Thompson Memo’s provisions pertaining to attorney-client privilege and 
the potential impact that waiver had during regulatory investigations.185
After a coalition of business and legal organizations expressed concerns 
about the provisions in the Thompson Memo,186 the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary held hearings to enact the Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 
2006.187
Then, on December 12, 2006, the DOJ released the McNulty Memo, 
incorporating the key aspects of the policy announced in the 
Attorney-Client Privilege Act.188 The McNulty Memo stated that federal 
prosecutors seeking privileged attorney-client communications or legal 
                                                                                                                         
178 Paulsen, supra note 142, at 1435.
179 Id. at 1435 n.5 (citing Jason McLure, Coalition Scores Major Victory in Policy Retreat: How 
Business, Civil Liberties Groups Pushed DOJ to Alter Fraud Stance, LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 18, 2006), 
http://advance.lexis.com/ (search in search bar: “LNSDUID-ALM-LGLTME-LT_2006_12_
14609350324372541469”)).
180 Id. (citing Lynnley Browning, Senator Calls for an Easing of Corporate-Wrongdoing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at C3 (noting that the proposed bill would amend the “nine factors that 
prosecutors must consider when weighing whether to indict” and “is the latest challenge to the tactics, 
which have come under scrutiny from trade groups, former United States attorneys general and a 
prominent federal judge”)).
181 See N. Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing, WASH. LAW.,
Feb. 2007, at 37 (“As a result of these pressures . . . the Department of Justice, with great fanfare, on 
December 12, 2006, replaced the Thompson Memorandum . . . .”).
182 See Letten & Montgomery, supra note 136 (noting that the Thompson Memo “for the most 
part remained in effect” through Deputy Attorney General James (Jim) B. Comey’s tenure from 2003–
05).
183 Id.
184 See McNulty, supra note 137, at 8 n.2 (“The reference to consideration of a corporation’s 
waiver of attorney-client . . . protections in reducing a corporation’s culpability score . . . was deleted 
effective November 1, 2006.”). 
185 Janis, supra note 181, at 35.
186 McLure, supra note 179.
187 Janis, supra note 181, at 37.
188 Id. at 37, 39.
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advice given to a company had to first secure written approval from the 
Deputy Attorney General.189 Also, the McNulty Memo included direction 
that emphasized the DOJ’s consideration of a corporation’s meaningful 
compliance programs.190 These provisions were directly related to the 
perception that the Thompson Memo had gone too far in its policies 
relating to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, and demonstrated the 
power of industry maintaining a watchful eye on the DOJ moving 
forward.191
However, even under the McNulty Memo’s new terms, prosecutors 
and corporations continued to battle over attorney-client privilege 
problems that doomed the Thompson Memo.192 The clamor for change 
eventually led the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security to hold hearings in 2007 to determine 
whether the McNulty Memo’s guidance did enough to resolve the concerns 
stemming from the Thompson Memo.193 When Congress threatened new 
legislation addressing the lingering concerns in the McNulty Memo, the 
DOJ reacted with yet another revision.194
4. The Filip Memo (2008) 
The most recent memo, preceding the Yates memo, comes from 
Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, who served from 2008 to 2009.195
The Filip Memo’s most important revision focused once again on 
cooperation credit and whether credit is dependent upon a waiver of 
attorney-client privilege.196 The memo stated that waiver of privilege was 
not, and had never been, a prerequisite to the subject of an investigation 
being viewed as cooperative.197 The memo went on to state that a 
prosecutor should never ask a corporation to waive its protections under 
attorney-client privilege.198 Rather, the memo clarified that the emphasis 
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should be on whether the corporation provided investigators with all 
relevant facts.199
In addition to announcing that attorney-client privilege was not a 
consideration in determining whether to charge an entity, the Filip Memo 
stated that a company’s determination that it would pay its employees’ 
legal fees was also not a consideration for cooperation credit.200 The Filip 
Memo’s changes marked a significant winnowing down of the 
considerations available to prosecutors when determining whether to 
charge companies for misconduct. However, cooperation credit remained 
an extremely important tool for companies under investigation to 
potentially limit liability.201 As the legality of prior policies came under 
fire, the DOJ was forced to react in kind. Thus, by the time the Filip Memo 
was released, the “cooperation” in cooperation credit consisted of the 
disclosure of all relevant factual information to the investigation, but it did 
not include the waiver of any privileges.202
B. The Yates Memo 
The directives in the memos leading up to the Yates Memo share a 
number of collective principles, but they largely reflect a slow, methodical 
shift toward securing increased individual accountability for wrongdoing. 
This is to be expected given that the memos typically revise or build upon, 
instead of wholly replace, their predecessors’ policies.203 Therefore, the 
announcement of the Yates Memo was especially significant because it 
foreshadows another significant ground shift specifically targeting 
criminally culpable corporate actors.204
When the DOJ issued the Yates Memo on September 9, 2015,205 it 
represented the fifth such memo in fifteen years to address the prosecution 
of wrongdoing by corporate entities and individuals.206 The Yates Memo is 
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broken up into six directives that have already been incorporated into the 
U.S. Attorney’s Manual.207 The Yates Memo states that it will apply to 
both criminal and civil corporate investigations that occur both in the 
future and those pending as of the date of the Yates Memo’s release.208
This section will first describe each of the directives in greater detail. 
In order to determine the viability of the Yates Memo’s effectiveness, a 
brief discussion of the initial commentary will follow. The section will 
culminate with a discussion of how the Yates Memo interacts with the 
current standards used to govern federal oversight investigations. 
1. Cooperation Credit 
The Yates Memo’s most striking policy change pertains to the 
extension of cooperation credit for companies that are under 
investigation.209 The policy states that in order “[t]o be eligible for any
cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department [of 
Justice] all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate 
misconduct.”210 Cooperation credit is used by the DOJ and other regulatory 
bodies to lower the liability for corporations that provide timely and
thorough disclosures of all facts pertaining to the matter at issue.211
This disclosure requirement also pertains to facts about culpable 
individuals from the outset.212
If the directive is strictly interpreted, it will require companies seeking 
cooperation credit to not only disclose what they know about the actions 
taken to date, but also to engage in the process of learning the facts 
necessary to meet the DOJ’s needs.213 Only then, once the company has 
met this new threshold test, can the company even be considered eligible to 
receive cooperation credit according to the “other traditionally applied 
factors.”214 This policy represents a sharp change from memos in the past. 
As Deputy Attorney General Yates stated:
In the past, cooperation credit was a sliding scale of sorts and 
companies could still receive at least some credit . . . even if 
they failed to fully disclose all facts about individuals. That’s 
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changed now. . . . [P]roviding complete information about 
individuals’ involvement in wrongdoing is a threshold hurdle 
that must be crossed before we’ll consider any cooperation
credit.215
Commentators have labeled this an “all-or-nothing” proposition216 that 
assumes that companies are currently withholding significant information 
from investigators.217 While the validity of this concern might vary on a 
case-by-case basis, a company faces the difficult task of proceeding 
without cooperation credit that was once a key mitigation benefit used by 
corporations for leverage in negotiating less severe penalties. Also, the 
policy significantly increases the burden for corporations to find 
information about culpable individuals.218 Rather than settling with a 
company’s stated failure to find culpable individuals, the new guidance 
basically requires the company to bring forth an individual or group of 
individuals, or disclose all of the information used to determine that no 
culpable individual was involved. This disclosure may include information 
that is or is not privileged,219 reintroducing problems of the not-so-distant 
past.
There are numerous implications for companies under the new 
application of the cooperation policy. First, engaging in potential “life or 
death” investigations may require incredible expense and longer periods of
investigation.220 This could be detrimental to normal business operations, 
which ultimately hurts not just the company but also its shareholders. 
Second, because of its all-or-nothing structure, companies can no longer 
receive partial credit for partial disclosure.221 Therefore, some companies 
may determine that engaging in the process as defined under the Yates 
Memo is too costly and decide to go silent or not fully engage in the 
process.222 This would require the DOJ to conduct a full investigation with 
little chance of receiving internal assistance without compromising its goal 
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of prosecuting all culpable parties. If this strategy is initially successful in 
stifling regulatory action, it could also become the norm, which would 
defeat the policy’s overall goal. Third, the process of engaging in an 
internal investigation that employees know is intended to identify and 
isolate culpable individuals will likely encounter resistance.223 Employees 
will be less inclined to cooperate with management without hiring their 
own personal counsel, and lower level employees that cannot afford to do 
so may determine that it is in their best interest to not participate at all. 
Despite these potential concerns, the cooperation credit policy delivers 
an undeniably strong message that the DOJ wants to increase personal 
liability at all costs. For those officers and directors tasked with designing 
and implementing oversight programs, the cooperation credit policy 
provides an added incentive to design a program that can quickly and
definitively identify culpable individuals. Once a DOJ investigation is 
underway, this will permit the board and management to react swiftly and
present investigators with the information needed to benefit from the 
cooperation policy. However, if these systems of oversight are not yet in 
place, the prospect of going without cooperation credit becomes much 
more likely as the DOJ will no longer accept marginal or incomplete 
information. 
2. Individual Culpability
The second directive also speaks directly to the DOJ’s desire to 
increase individual liability. The policy states that both “criminal and civil 
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the inception of 
the investigation.”224 While early directives like the Holder Memo or the 
Thompson Memo merely alluded to personal liability as an ancillary part 
of a DOJ investigation, this policy reflects the idea that if individuals are 
targeted at the outset, it is more likely that they will be held culpable at the 
end when charges are filed.225
The Yates Memo identifies three goals in relation to the policy.226
First, the policy seeks to maximize the discovery of corporate wrongdoing,
because the corporation itself can only act through individuals.227 Second, 
the policy increases the likelihood that individuals with knowledge of the 
facts at issue will cooperate and provide information on other culpable 
individuals further up the managerial hierarchy.228 This goal is especially 
important in the context of corporate oversight as lower-tier employees 
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may be more inclined to provide incriminating information against those 
that hold positions of power. Third, the policy increases the chance that the 
ultimate resolution of the investigation will result in criminal and/or civil 
charges being filed not only against the company, but also against culpable 
individuals.229
From the perspective of company employees, this policy presents 
challenges because investigators must be dissuaded of their initial 
conceptions of events rather than being led naturally to make reasonable 
assessments from facts as they are discovered. If an actor is identified at 
the outset of an investigation as being potentially culpable, that individual 
must either convince investigators that he or she is not involved in the 
misconduct, or in the alternative, provide information that would inculpate 
another. Again, this dynamic has the potential to dramatically shift the 
internal relations of a company and might make it costlier to defend.
3. Investigator Communication
The third policy prioritizes the need for the DOJ to maximize the 
efficacy of its resources by demanding that “[c]riminal and civil attorneys 
handling corporate investigations . . . be in routine communication with 
one another.”230 This policy is by no means revolutionary, but its inclusion 
in the Yates Memo reflects the idea that the DOJ seeks to formalize its 
investigatory and prosecutorial processes in order to effectuate the best 
results. It also signals that the DOJ is preparing for an increased workload 
and wants to make sure that its policies and procedures foster efficiency 
and communication.
Practically speaking, the policy will require attorneys at the beginning 
of a respective case to contact the “other side of the house” about the 
investigation.231 While this may present potential issues regarding the 
permissible disclosures stemming from the civil side to the criminal side,
and vice versa, the goal is to exchange as much information as possible 
under the direction of the law.232
4. Individual Immunity
The fourth policy states that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, no 
corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability 
for any individuals.”233 While the actual application of the other policies 
may result in more anxiety for directors and officers, this policy is 
extremely concerning for corporate personnel on its face. Under the 
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directive, the government will not enter into any agreement with a 
company where immunity is offered or other charges are dismissed for 
potentially culpable individuals unless there are “extraordinary 
circumstances.”234 Although it is unclear what extraordinary circumstances 
might be in practice, the fact that these exculpatory “deals” are only 
available now in special cases is concerning for directors and officers. As 
evidence of the procedural hurdles that must be cleared to offer such 
benefits, the prosecutor must secure personal approval in writing from the 
relevant supervising Assistant Attorney General or U.S. Attorney on the 
case in order to grant immunity.235 This is a high threshold that indicates 
that immunity will no longer be granted without sufficient justification that 
furthers the DOJ’s overarching goals.
5. Exculpatory Limitations
The fifth policy outlined by the Yates Memo relates strongly to the 
fourth policy and requires corporate cases to “not be resolved without a 
clear plan to resolve individual cases before the statute of limitations 
expires and declinations as to individuals in such cases must be 
memorialized.”236 This policy basically removes any excuse the DOJ might 
have for missing out on an opportunity to prosecute an otherwise culpable 
individual.237
Specifically, the policy requires that when a company resolves its 
offenses at a time before the resolution of all related individual 
investigations or prosecutions, the DOJ attorney must include a number of 
key facts in the prosecution or corporate authorization memorandum.238
First, the attorney must include a discussion of any potentially liable 
individuals.239 Second, the attorney must include a description of the 
current status of the investigation of individuals and any ongoing work that 
is still not complete.240 Third, the attorney must include a plan to bring the 
investigation to a close within the applicable statute of limitations 
period.241 This largely procedural policy indicates that the DOJ will not 
permit cases of potentially culpable individuals to go stale and result in a 
missed opportunity. This represents a strong rhetorical device that 
motivates DOJ personnel to maintain a close eye on drawn-out 
investigations and also indicates to potentially culpable individuals that 
they are unlikely to sneak by on a technicality. 
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6. Irrelevance of Ability to Pay 
The final policy directs DOJ civil attorneys to no longer consider a 
potentially culpable individual’s ability to pay a fine when deciding 
whether to bring suit. Instead, the attorneys should give equal weight to the 
deterrent value of the proposed civil action, the value of a winning 
recovery at trial, and the ability for a civil penalty to take away any benefit 
the suspect has garnered via his misconduct to ensure that the individual 
cannot profit from his wrongdoing.242 The Yates Memo also looks at the 
practical effects that engaging in a civil suit might have on individuals.243 
The benefit that is achieved in deterring similar behavior and also 
disclosing to the public that its resources are being protected is important 
to changing the current perceptions about corporate legal action. 
When considered together, the Yates Memo’s six policies carry a 
strong and frightening message to all levels of company actors: the rules 
have changed. However, the real implications of the Yates Memo have yet 
to be seen. The best indication of the Yates Memo’s efficacy at this time is 
garnered through a review of commentators’ projections and how 
companies are interpreting the policies.  
C. Applying Yates: More Bark than Bite?  
The Yates Memo’s release resulted in responses from the legal 
community that ran the gamut from the perspective that the policies are 
nothing new and will have no impact to extreme concern that the corporate 
liability structure as we know it is about to fall to pieces.244  
A significant number of commentators expressed their belief that the 
Yates Memo will do what it sets out to do—at least to varying degrees. 
The commentators on this side of the debate are far more cautious about 
the extent to which the Yates Memo will work given that it was just 
recently released. They also defer to the need for patience, as the Yates 
Memo will take time to enact and produce identifiable results.245  
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The Yates Memo’s primary goal is to signal a change in policy where 
individual liability is a strong priority.246 Also, because of the Yates 
Memo’s explicit terms, the expectations for companies conducting internal 
investigations have never been clearer.247 Whereas other prosecutorial 
directives have included similarly—or even the same—strong language, 
the simultaneous public relations campaign that followed the Yates 
Memo’s release supports the idea that the DOJ means business.248 Further, 
the consequences for failing to meet those expectations are also explicitly 
clear,249 leaving directors and officers to seek out additional information 
from counsel about the Yates Memo’s implications. 
As such, a number of commentators included their ideas on what 
companies should prepare for.250 The primary message advises directors 
and officers to plan for the very real possibility that they will face 
individual liability.251 This message has two applications. First, directors 
and officers should review the company’s compliance and oversight 
programs.252 Being able to exercise oversight with or without significant 
warnings will provide additional protection by showing that the board and 
management were fully engaged. In addition, the oversight and compliance 
programs should be able to quickly react to the needs of the company 
under an internal investigation based on the higher standards announced in 
the Yates Memo.253 Second, directors and officers should review their 
liability packages to understand the increased risks under the Yates 
Memo’s policies.254 Specifically, attention should be given to determining 
whether penalties and fines are covered if assessed by the regulatory 
agency, and how prosecutions involving multiple defendants under the 
same plan affect an individual’s coverage.255
While the preparations outlined above imply that commentators 
believe that the Yates Memo will have an impact on business oversight, it 
is unclear when this will occur. The reaction throughout the legal 
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community seems to imply that the Yates Memo has already had a modest 
impact based on the preparatory actions taken by many companies, but it 
will be some time before we can conduct any empirical analysis. For 
companies and their directors and officers, the prospect of falling behind 
may be too risky to wait and see how the Yates Memo’s policies are 
interpreted. Therefore, engaging in preemptive reviews of company 
oversight and compliance policies, as well as the director and officer 
protections, are prudent measures.
On the other hand, the primary concerns from commentators that 
believe the Yates Memo will be ineffective start with the idea that its 
primary goal is nothing new.256 This perspective relies on the fact that 
many of the memos from prior Deputy Attorneys General had similar 
aspirations of increasing individual liability.257 However, none of these 
memos contain the same degree of explicit language that escalates personal 
liability to the same priority level as attaining liability for companies. The 
Yates Memo states in no uncertain terms that individual liability is equally 
as important as company liability. It then goes on to reinforce this premise 
with six concise policies that directly speak to that goal. 
Other commentators believe the Yates Memo will be ineffective 
because of its practical impediments.258 The policies under prior memos 
also encouraged company cooperation, and while the new policies under 
the Yates Memo add requirements, the situation remains the same: the DOJ 
can only make a case based on the information made available to it.259
Again, while this critique is warranted, the added pressure for companies 
to open up to the investigators or suffer the consequences results in a 
high-stakes gamble. This pressure is also extended to individuals more 
directly under the new policies and may drive increased disclosures. 
Another practical complication raised by more skeptical commentators 
as well as those that believe the policies will work is the potential that the 
Yates Memo’s directives will consume too many DOJ resources to remain 
sustainable.260 Again, only time will tell the validity of this concern. If the 
DOJ’s directives are interpreted to require prosecutions in each and every 
situation where culpable individuals are found, the requisite manpower will 
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be immense. However, it should also be noted that the policies under the 
Yates Memo require investigations to be carried out largely by the 
companies themselves. Assuming that this is an effective and trustworthy 
process, the obligations of the DOJ during an investigation may lessen and 
allow DOJ personnel to engage in the pursuit of other directives. 
The reception of the Yates Memo upon its announcement reflects the 
impact that new policies can have on the market. While some have 
dismissed the Yates Memo as more of the same old policy seen in other 
DOJ memos, others have reacted strongly by advising companies to review 
their internal policies in preparation for potential problems. For Delaware, 
the prospect of waiting until the companies incorporated within the state 
are being subjected to personal criminal liability could be a significant risk. 
With its prominent position in the field of corporate law and its heavy 
reliance on the revenues it receives as the business law leader,261 Delaware 
would be best suited to look closely at the Yates Memo and incorporate the 
necessary changes to its oversight standards to best protect against 
individual culpability. 
III. DIRECTORIAL DUTIES REDIRECTED
In what way, if any, should Delaware common law react to the Yates 
Memo’s stringent prosecutorial posture towards corporate criminality? 
Some already suggest a significant retooling of Delaware’s existing 
fiduciary duty framework is necessary because Caremark and Stone
provide precious little guidance regarding the necessary steps directors and 
officers must take to exercise sufficient oversight.262 Under the existing 
common law approach, “[i]n theory, directors face potential liability for 
failed oversight. But in practice it is viewed as an unworkable and virtually 
meaningless standard where liability exists only within a very narrow 
procedural footing.”263 As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in 
Caremark, a claim based on failed oversight is “possibly the most difficult 
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”264 Indeed, Delaware courts continue to place strict limits on 
establishing oversight liability that effectively immunize directors from 
responsibility except when “directors knowingly and completely fail”265 to 
act in light of obvious corporate misconduct.
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The shortcomings under the rather lax Delaware common law 
approach to oversight become especially pronounced in light of the 
potential for criminal prosecution. If a director could remain insulated from 
civil liability under Caremark and Stone yet face criminal culpability under 
state or federal law, the guidance provided by Delaware common law 
regarding oversight obligations seems almost irrelevant if not bizarre. 
Avoiding jail seems a far greater priority than suffering some economic 
loss, which might in any case be covered by a blanket director and officer 
(“D&O”) liability insurance policy.266 Indeed, as a result of the 
prosecutorial shift under the Yates Memo, 
allegations of director oversight conduct that would not have 
been sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in the
Caremark “bad faith/conscious disregard” context, would 
nevertheless be enough for the DOJ expert to argue that the 
company’s compliance program was ineffective (because of 
inadequate board oversight), and for government attorneys to 
persist in an investigation of potential individual or 
organizational liability.267
Moreover, the imposition of criminal liability on a director would likely 
trigger an exception to the business judgment rule and remove the 
presumption that the director’s oversight practices comported with 
common law fiduciary obligations.268 In that respect, the Delaware 
common law appears rather schizophrenic: oversight practices that 
arguably passed fiduciary muster retroactively fail the same test once 
criminal liability attaches on other grounds.
To prevent such bizarre outcomes, Delaware common law must bend 
to fit the reality of the prosecutorial climate currently facing directors and 
officers. Gaining confidence in that conclusion requires a brief explication 
of some various options Delaware courts and the legislature might pursue. 
The first involves a simple stand-still where Delaware continues on its 
common law course as if the actions of government prosecutors have no 
impact on the import and application of Delaware law. The second option 
involves extending the “bad faith” exception to the business judgment rule 
that would proactively involve a consideration of the potential criminality 
of otherwise protected oversight practices. The third, and most cogent 
approach, involves enhancing the content of the common law standards 
articulated in Caremark and Stone to reflect the oversight obligations 
directors and officers actually face. 
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A. Delaware Stands Its Ground 
Doing nothing represents the easiest but most dangerous course for 
Delaware to pursue. Retaining, unchanged, the holdings in Caremark and 
Stone would cast a blind eye to the change in prosecutorial policies and 
double down on the notion that directors and officers enjoy the protection 
of the business judgment rule—and therefore escape civil liability—with 
little oversight effort.269 To the extent a glaring incongruity develops 
between the guidance Delaware fiduciary duties provide to officers and 
directors and the ultimate civil and criminal liability those corporate 
managers face, Delaware law will lose its place as the primary standard for 
guiding corporate behavior.270
Perhaps the stand-still approach would reflect a calculation that the 
Yates Memo will not have its anticipated impact and the frequency of 
finding individually culpable directors and officers in both the criminal and 
civil context will remain low.271 However, if Delaware gambles on this 
outcome and the Yates Memo is modestly enforced, there will be a 
significant gap between the standards outlined in Caremark and Stone, and 
those required from officers and directors by the DOJ.272 Unlike the 
application of Caremark, where directors and officers were found to not be 
criminally liable for their failure to properly administer the company’s 
oversight program,273 future cases could involve high-level personnel 
partaking in civil trials after being found to be criminally culpable for 
failing to engage in proper oversight.274 Furthermore, if the lax oversight 
systems established under current Delaware law are not subject to 
additional requirements, the Yates Memo’s directives for cooperation and 
investigatory assistance will leave many of Delaware’s companies without 
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sufficient systems to qualify for cooperation credits that lower their 
exposure and liability. 
The implications for the business community in general are also an 
important consideration. As the Yates Memo is implemented, any number 
of these companies’ directors and officers might be subject to criminal 
liability, but remain civilly protected by the business judgment rule. 
While this may be acceptable for some companies, others will seek to 
conform to the law that best represents the most stringent requirements 
applicable. In that case, Delaware’s reputation is likely to suffer and it 
could see a decrease in the number of entities incorporating there annually. 
For those companies that continue to incorporate in Delaware and adhere 
to the less stringent requirements, the potential of suffering federal liability 
is significant. In 2015, Delaware had 1.18 million entities incorporated 
under its law.275 With such a substantial percentage of American 
businesses adopting Delaware standards as their state law, many public 
companies could be vulnerable to federal liability.
B. The Bad Faith Exception 
A second option for Delaware is to apply the business judgment rule’s 
bad faith or illegality exception.276 Delaware’s business judgment rule 
includes a presumption that directors of a corporation make decisions on 
“an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”277 However, this 
presumption may be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the directors 
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.”278
Under these Delaware cases, the showing of illegal activity by a plaintiff 
should preclude the use of the business judgment rule for protection 
against personal liability.279
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In order for Delaware to apply the exception, it must be assumed that 
the criminal proceeding against a company and its directors and officers 
has already come to a conclusion by the time a civil trial commences. In 
Caremark280 and Stone,281 the results of the criminal proceedings were 
already known to the court when the civil trials took place under Delaware 
law. Thus, the Delaware court could then determine if criminally culpable 
behavior took place according to the outcome of the criminal proceedings 
against the defendant and then determine if the business judgment rule 
would apply in the civil proceeding.282 And of course, in Caremark and 
Stone, the directors faced no liability for failed oversight despite the 
rampant criminal activity afoot within the corporation.283
If a director or officer were tried criminally prior to a civil suit, a 
conviction should be permissible evidence to support a finding that illegal 
behavior took place when adjudicated in the civil proceeding.284 Similarly, 
a criminal acquittal should not be used to prove that the individual’s 
behavior was legal in a civil proceeding, and a plea bargain should not bar 
a finding that the individual did not engage in illegal behavior either.285 In 
each scenario, the outcome of the criminal trial should simply stand as 
evidence, but the plaintiff in the criminal proceeding would have to still 
mount a winning case. This would help winnow out cases that lack 
sufficient evidence and prevent a deluge of derivative lawsuits from 
shareholders hoping to capitalize on the lower evidentiary threshold.
In cases where a criminal proceeding has not reached its ultimate 
conclusion, a corporation or potentially liable individuals could consider 
requesting a stay of a related civil proceeding until after the criminal 
trial.286 The decision of whether to stay a civil proceeding is likely 
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dependent in part on the amount of overlap between the facts of the related 
criminal and civil trials.287 If a corporation or individual believes that the 
facts support a finding of not guilty in the criminal context, then it might 
be favorable to wait until after the criminal proceeding is completed. 
However, if they believe that they will lose, then staying the decision 
would grant plaintiffs an opportunity to use that information against them. 
Regardless of the procedural complexities regarding the application of 
the bad faith exception, the approach still misses the essential point that 
absent some strengthening of Delaware common law oversight obligations, 
the fiduciary duty framework will no longer provide relevant guidance to 
officers and directors. Instead, corporate counsel will need to look to a 
variety of other state and federal laws dealing with oversight obligations to 
determine the minimal steps necessary to avoid civil and criminal 
liability.288 Quite simply, absent significant enhancement of the current 
common law standards, Delaware fiduciary principles regarding corporate 
oversight obligations will get cast to the periphery of relevance. 
C. Enhancing Caremark and Stone
By enhancing the oversight standards articulated Caremark and Stone,
Delaware courts could adopt a more rigorous set of guidelines for business 
oversight that reflect the reality of the world directors and officers inhabit. 
But what would a revamping of Caremark and Stone actually entail? 
Any effort that falls short of the what the Yates Memo reflects would still 
risk the obsolescence of Delaware fiduciary standards. Therefore, retaining 
the preeminence of Delaware law as the guiding light of corporate 
behavior, the common law standards governing corporate compliance 
should closely reflect the standards for oversight stated in the 
U.S. Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”), as amended in the wake of the release 
of the Yates Memo.
USAM § 9-28.800 provides the provisions relating to the Yates 
Memo’s Corporate Compliance Programs.289 The section states that 
corporate management systems are meant to “prevent and detect 
misconduct” and “ensure that corporate activities are conducted in 
accordance with applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and 
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rules.”290 These provisions are standard and would largely reflect even the 
current law from Caremark and Stone. However, the USAM goes on to 
state that “the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and 
of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct 
undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”291
This provision would require an overhaul of the first prong of Caremark,
which states in part that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board 
to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack 
of good faith that is necessary to condition liability.”292 Similarly, Stone’s 
first prong is equally incongruent with the USAM directive, stating that a 
director must “utterly fail[] to implement any reporting system or controls”
thereof to be culpable.293
In order to better reflect the Yates Memo’s directives and provide both 
an adequate warning and establish a proper floor for a Delaware company 
to abide by federal law, the Delaware courts would have to engage in a 
qualitative analysis of the oversight system that is in place. Although 
engaging in such substantive review certainly represents a shift in how the 
common law presumption of the business judgment rule gets applied, 
permitting the floor for oversight activity to remain so insubstantial is 
incongruent with the USAM requirements. Nonetheless, no need for 
violent jurisprudential shockwaves exists. With a narrow set of facts 
related specifically to egregious oversight (arguably subject to criminal 
liability in the federal prosecutorial context), the exception for willful 
blindness under Stone could be expanded quite easily.294
Luckily, Delaware courts are well suited to engage in such a far-reaching 
endeavor based on their structure and ability to create judge-made law.295
Indeed, the Delaware courts often instigate reform outside the legislative 
process in order to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of standards guiding 
business practices.296
To provide additional direction to the Delaware court in conceiving the 
language of the new rule, the USAM provides two factors of analysis used 
to evaluate any oversight program.297 First, is whether “the program is 
adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and 
detecting wrongdoing by employees.”298 Second, is whether the corporate 
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management is “enforcing the program or is tacitly encouraging or 
pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business 
objectives.”299 Taken together, these two factors require active engagement 
with the oversight system implemented by a company in order to even 
begin an analysis of whether director and officers are potentially liable. 
The second factor is especially relevant to addressing the second prong 
of Stone, which required a director or officer to “consciously fail[] to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”300 Under the 
second factor of the USAM, the second prong of Stone would be 
insufficient in its oversight requirements. Instead, directors and officers 
would be expected to enforce the program and react quickly and decisively 
to stop any perceived misconduct.
The degree to which Delaware wholly adopts the USAM directives 
would depend on the apparent vulnerability of the companies subject to the 
new regulatory framework. If the Yates Memo is seen as being applicable 
to every company equally, then Delaware should take great care to adopt a 
broad version of the USAM standard. If the Yates Memo is only likely to 
apply to corporations within the Fortune 500, Delaware can adjust the
language of the resulting rule to exclude closely held entities and those that 
have only minute oversight liability. 
Ultimately, the best alternative for Delaware would be to enhance 
significantly the oversight standards articulated in Caremark and Stone. By 
adopting more robust oversight requirements that mirror the Yates Memo’s 
requirements, Delaware would offer the best protection for companies 
incorporated in the state with fewer obstacles than the other two 
alternatives. Not engaging in any fiduciary law reform leaves Delaware 
companies extremely vulnerable to liability under the Yates Memo’s new 
directives. Also, failing to react to the new policies could cause Delaware’s 
law to become irrelevant as corporate counsel realize they cannot protect 
their clients by seeking the flimsy umbrella of protection afforded under 
the business judgment rule.301
In addition, the prospect of using the illegality exception to the 
business judgment rule has weaknesses. First, there may be evidentiary 
obstacles to using the evidence or convictions from criminal proceedings 
against defendants in civil trials. For example, under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e), criminal prosecutors are generally precluded 
from sharing evidence garnered during a grand jury hearing with civil 
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prosecutors.302 Another consideration is the use of strategic stays to protect 
the over extension of access to evidence through discovery. Due to the 
more expansive scope of the civil discovery process when compared to the 
criminal discovery process, defendants might attempt to use a stay in the 
civil proceeding so that the criminal proceeding is not tainted by evidence 
that would not be otherwise discoverable.303 Second, there are potential 
concerns relating to the manner in which the civil and criminal 
investigations might interact.304 For the DOJ, the ability to rely on the two 
investigatory bodies is a great benefit and helps increase efficiency. 
However, from a business’s perspective, the prospect of abiding by the 
Yates Memo’s cooperation policies in order to receive credit in a criminal 
proceeding only to have the information that is disclosed be used against it 
in the civil context will make the new system untenable. It would be much 
more likely that corporations would decide to go silent and not engage in 
any exchange of information in order to avoid potentially incurring liability 
on both the civil and criminal fronts.305
Under Delaware’s more rigorous, new standard, the obligation for 
officers and directors to actively engage in the oversight process could 
generate positive benefits for companies of all sizes.306 The board and 
management would be far more likely to be aware of any issues that 
present risks to the company if the failure to monitor or oversee operations 
exposed directors and officers to personal liability. This is true whether the 
entity is large or small because the obligation is the same across the board. 
Further, if the company identified an internal scandal, it would be in 
position to address it immediately rather than having it linger and 
potentially spread. This could preclude subsequent investigations or suits 
under the Yates Memo’s new terms simply by addressing the problem 
before it reached a critical mass. 
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The new standard would also bolster Delaware’s business judgment 
rule jurisprudence and perform the standard-setting function that is 
currently missing. Perhaps most importantly, the rules create a synergy 
between the obligations expected from the Delaware courts and the federal 
regulatory entities. The likelihood that a director or officer would be 
subject to criminal liability under federal law and be protected by the 
business judgment rule under Delaware law is greatly diminished. 
While there may be costs to the Delaware court system initially, the 
eventual changes that will occur when directors and officers prioritize 
business oversight from a preemptive perspective, instead of a reactive 
perspective, are significant.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Enhancing Delaware’s common law standards regarding compliance 
and oversight would produce significant advantages for the public, 
Delaware corporations, and officers and directors. Although some risks 
certainly exist as well,307 the drawbacks fail to tip the scale in favor of 
jurisprudential stasis.
A. More Successful Prosecutions of Individuals
Under a system that effectively melds the federal standards outlined in 
the Yates Memo and the Delaware common law regarding managerial 
oversight, it will be more likely that criminal prosecutions of individuals 
will result in guilty verdicts. The reason for this is twofold. First, as the 
new Delaware standard is accounted for in board rooms throughout the 
country, companies are more likely to incorporate stronger, more effective 
oversight systems in order to comply with the law.308 These systems will 
be better suited to identify problems in a company’s operations and will 
also alert the board and directors to misconduct among low-level and 
middle-level employees. Because these employees’ liability is often easier 
to identify,309 more mundane infractions will be discovered, addressed 
internally, and reported voluntarily based on the desire to benefit from 
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cooperation credit.310 As these systems winnow down the number of 
actionable instances of misconduct, the DOJ is more likely to engage in 
investigations of alleged misconduct against companies that have 
committed serious offenses simply because the other, less-severe actions 
are more easily identified and handled by the entity itself.311
Second, in sharp contrast, the companies that are most vulnerable are 
those that do not have compliance systems or have systems that are so 
mismanaged, neglected, or dysfunctional that they offer no benefit to either 
the entity by deterring and identifying misbehavior or to DOJ investigators 
as a benefit used to grant cooperation credit.312 As such, these companies 
and their directors and officers are far more likely to fall victim to the 
investigatory pitfalls outlined, which the Yates Memo seeks to punish. 
These directors and officers are also less likely to prevail at trial because 
they will not benefit from cooperation credits and their internal 
investigations will reap less useful evidence than those entities with 
established systems.313
The DOJ is also likely to become more efficient in its investigatory 
process as time passes. By encouraging companies to have strong, 
established business oversight policies, the DOJ is facilitating the oversight 
process and also setting the table for internal investigations. For those 
companies that comply and still encounter problems, the DOJ will have a 
streamlined set of standards that they can use to review the company’s 
actions and determine who knew what and when, resulting in more 
personal liability with less work for DOJ personnel. By engaging and 
benefitting from a company’s own investigatory resources, the DOJ also 
saves time and money at the initial stages of a prosecution. Ultimately, this 
will result in culpable individuals within the company being subject to 
personal liability on both the civil and criminal fronts. 
B. Increased Investor Confidence
The stakes are also high for the market under the new standard. 
Delaware law has enormous implications for public companies traded on 
the global financial markets. Historically, investor confidence ebbs and 
flows based on the latest corporate scandal that comes to light and thus
                                                                                                                         
310 Banks & Lord, supra note 305, at 1.
311 See id. (“A company implementing an ‘effective’ compliance program under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines does so to demonstrate that it used due diligence to “prevent and detect 
wrongdoing.”).
312 See Yockey, supra note 256, at 411 (noting that prior DOJ directives engaging in some form of 
compliance permitted consideration of cooperation credits, but under the Yates Memo a corporation or 
individual must comply in order to be considered for cooperation). 
313 See Jones & Nicholson, supra note 219, at 271 (finding that corporations that want to preserve 
the option to benefit from cooperation credit will create compliance regimes and internal investigations 
that generate evidence of individual wrongdoing). 
438 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:2
erodes investor confidence.314 By adopting clearly articulated and 
reasonable standards, companies can better adapt their policies to the rules 
of the game. This will create more stability and over time, lower the 
number of market-shaking scandals. By actively engaging in oversight and 
in some cases, hiring compliance personnel to prevent misconduct, 
companies might also use their clean records as a means of showing their 
investors that they are trustworthy and engaging in business the right 
way.315
As major corporate scandals have shown, the financial markets are 
becoming increasingly inaccessible to the lower and middle classes.316 Part 
of this stems from a lack of confidence in corporate management to do the 
right thing and address serious issues before massive legal expenses are 
incurred and regulatory fines are levied. Instead, a select few collect a 
disproportionate amount of the wealth and common stakeholders are left to 
pick up the costs for misconduct in the form of legal fees, fines, and 
settlements.317 This all-too-frequent problem betrays the notion that society 
confers special benefits upon corporations with the idea that they exist for 
legal convenience and not for the purposes of engaging in unregulated 
misconduct and abuse.318 By using criminal and civil law in tandem as 
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(arguing that corporate scandals reflect an economic prioritization of wealthy insiders who have access 
to information that average citizens lack, and this advantage is often camouflaged in order to make the 
corporate structure seem more fair).
317 See id. (arguing that executives cash in their stocks when the company declines, meaning the 
stakeholders are subject to higher costs due to the executives’ misconduct).
318 Corporations are granted special rights such as “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable 
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital 
and to deploy their resources . . . .” Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression,
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dependable deterrent devices to restore the equilibrium between corporate 
and societal benefits, investors may slowly return to the market and 
reintroduce capital that has been used elsewhere in recent years.319
C. Increased Efficiency in Delaware Law
Enhancing the content of Delaware fiduciary duties regarding 
managerial oversight and compliance will necessarily enhance corporate 
efficiency. Efficient corporate governance rules reflect what corporate 
managers, shareholders, and other non-shareholder constituencies would 
hypothetically negotiate in a world of perfect information, freedom of 
contract, and zero transaction costs.320 Of course, the reality of our world 
prevents those conditions from being obtained. As a result, determining the 
content of the hypothetical bargain presents quite a challenge. 
Even if the precise outcome of the bargain remains a mystery, 
however, maintaining a corporate culture that prevents employees and 
other corporate agents from producing negative externalities eventually 
borne by shareholders necessarily makes an efficient outcome more 
likely.321 Why? If corporate managers are able to engage in illegal activity 
without any reproach from investors, they will have no incentive to avoid 
nefarious actions when determining which corporate path to pursue. On the 
other hand, the vulnerability to shareholder action made possible by more 
stringent common law oversight standards provides the opposite incentive 
to consider thoughtfully actual shareholder preferences. To the extent 
corporate rules facilitate the consideration of actual shareholder interests 
(whether on corporate oversight practices or any other concern), corporate 
                                                                                                                         
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2661 (2008). However, when the corporate form is used for abuse, 
corporate actors betray the responsibilities that accompany the grant of the special rights described 
above. 
319 Engaging a dual-front effort to reform corporate misbehavior can also help conserve resources 
and increase efficiency. Eli Ewing, Too Close for Comfort: United States v. Stringer and United States 
v. Scurshy Impose a Stricter Standard on SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
217, 224 (2006).
320 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1153–54 (1996) (noting fiduciary principles 
provide what stockholders want regarding corporate information and the duty of directors); see 
generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1201–03 (1999) (describing the areas expanded social 
disclosure ideally would include).
321 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of 
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 989 (2014) (arguing that 
mandatory disclosure cuts costs because it reduces the cost of shareholder monitoring and serves as 
support for the shareholders role of corporate governance); David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The 
Sarbanes—Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 453 (2004) (noting 
mandatory disclosure requirements result in transparency and thus increase the informational efficiency 
of the market); Williams, supra note 320, at 1200 (noting financial transparency allows in-depth 
financial analysis of public companies).
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managers more closely track the true preferences of shareholders rather 
than some stilted idea of shareholders’ interest only in wealth 
maximization.322 Because some shareholders possess (intense) preferences 
for a variety of environmental, social, or other political commitments 
related to compliance and oversight, ignoring the reality of their 
preferences in shaping corporate governance rules disconnects the content 
of the rule from what real parties to the bargain ultimately desire. An 
enhanced corporate compliance rule would more effectively engage 
corporate managers in a dialogue with shareholders about the extent to 
which corporations should even engage in oversight, perhaps even in 
excess of what current prosecutorial standards entail.323 Through enhanced 
discourse that pays adequate fidelity to the interests of affected corporate 
constituencies, an efficient outcome regarding the content of corporate 
governance rules becomes more likely. 
D. Delaware Remains Relevant
The final implication for the adoption of the new standards and 
increased synergy of the state and federal laws is that Delaware will remain 
relevant. As currently structured, fiduciary standards regarding corporate 
oversight offer little concrete guidance on what ultimately insulates 
directors and officers from liability. Without any bite, the business 
judgment rule does little to encourage companies to identify and quell acts 
of misconduct. As a result, public confidence in the justice system and 
investor confidence in the capital markets declines. By enhancing its 
common law standards for corporate compliance, Delaware could reclaim 
its place as the model for corporate law. Rather than being viewed as a 
governing structure that permits rampant illegality, the business judgment 
                                                                                                                         
322 See Michael R. Siebecker¸ Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure 
Through Fiduciary Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 115, 163–64 (2009) (noting that facilitating 
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323 For a discussion on the need to assess the actual preferences and profiles of diverse 
stakeholders in corporate law, see Helen Anderson, Creditors’ Rights of Recovery: Economic Theory, 
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of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 707 (2002) (promoting a dedication to actual 
stakeholder and shareholder interests in corporate decision making).
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rule could be revamped as a tool to provide meaningful guidance in 
preventing corporate calamities and scandals. 
CONCLUSION
The time to forge a new standard for business oversight liability has 
come in the form of the Yates Memo. The Delaware decisions in 
Caremark and Stone represent outdated standards that no longer provide a 
clear roadmap to business managers for evading civil or criminal liability. 
Modest changes could be made, however, that would align common law 
standards with the prevailing prosecutorial climate aimed at eradicating 
corporate criminality. In the end, redirecting Delaware common law 
fiduciary duties to follow federal prosecution standards will better ensure 
corporate accountability, render the common law more efficient, and 
restore public trust in the justice system and capital markets.
